



MAPPING MIGRATION

4TH EDITION

Voices from Churches in Europe

Edited by Kirk Sims



World Council
of Churches



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This is a copublication between the WCC and the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe

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Foreword from the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe General Secretary	XIII	Azerbaijan	28
Foreword from the World Council of Churches General Secretary	XV	Belarus	29
Preface	XVII	Belgium	30
Introduction	1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	31
Major Migratory Themes in Europe Today	3	Bulgaria	32
Freedom of Movement in the European Union <i>Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi</i>	5	Croatia	33
Temporary Protection in the European Union <i>Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi</i>	6	Cyprus	34
Europe "Protecting People More than Borders": Challenging the Current "Realism" Discourse and Lasting Myths <i>Torsten Moritz</i>	8	Czechia	35
Ukrainian Migration in Europe Since February 2022 <i>Kirk Sims</i>	11	Denmark	36
Europe's Southern Border <i>Paul Sydnor</i>	15	Estonia	37
The Syrian Migration Experience in Europe <i>Mor Polycarpus Dr Augin Aydin</i>	18	Finland	38
Migration, Climate Emergency, and Racism: Decolonizing Migration Policies in Europe <i>Masiwa Ragies Gunda</i>	19	France	39
Country Profiles and Migrant Infographics	21	Georgia	40
Albania	24	Germany	41
Andorra	25	Greece	42
Armenia	26	Hungary	43
Austria	27	Iceland	44
		Ireland	45
		Italy	46
		Latvia	47
		Liechtenstein	48
		Lithuania	49
		Luxembourg	50
		Malta	51
		Moldova	52
		Monaco	53
		Montenegro	54

Netherlands	55	Serbian Roma Economic and Transnational Migrants in Germany	103
		<i>Melody J. Wachsmuth</i>	
North Macedonia	56		
Norway	57	Ukrainian Displaced People in Western Europe: Crisis, Labour Laws, Entanglement, and New Connections	104
Poland	58		
Portugal	59	<i>Emil Hilton Saggau</i>	
Romania	60	Diakonia	107
Russia	61	<i>Ulla Siirto</i>	
San Marino	62	Ships of Solidarity: The Story of United4Rescue	109
Serbia	63	<i>Ansgar Gilster</i>	
Slovakia	64	Unaccompanied Minors in Greece: Trends and the Response of the Church of Greece	110
Slovenia	65	<i>Panteleimon Papasynefakis</i>	
Spain	66	Between Recovery and Belonging: AIDRom's Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Romania's Moldova Region	113
Sweden	67	<i>Michael Tița</i>	
Switzerland	68	Advocacy	117
Turkey	69	<i>Torsten Moritz</i>	
Ukraine	70	British Churches' Response to a Proposal to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda	118
United Kingdom	71	<i>Simeon Mitchell</i>	
European Union-related data sets	72		
Thinking theologically about migration	83	Bed, Bath, and Bread: A Case Study from the Netherlands	121
		<i>Karel Jungheim</i>	
Human Dignity and Human Rights: Central Motives for Churches' Work on Asylum and Migration	85	The 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum	123
<i>Heinrich Bedford-Strohm</i>		<i>Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi</i>	
Not the Final Word, but the Living Word: On the Relationship Between Theology and Migration	92	EU Advocacy in Practice: Step-by-Step Advocacy Strategy	125
<i>Ryszard Bobrowicz</i>		<i>Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi</i>	
Christian Unity	95	Endnotes	127
Reading Ecclesial Transformation Through Migration and Congregational Composition	97	Contributors	132
<i>Alessia Passarelli</i>		Photo Credits	134
"Being Church Together": The Italian Protestant Journey Toward Integration	99		
<i>Alessia Passarelli</i>			

FOREWORD FROM THE CHURCHES' COMMISSION FOR MIGRANTS IN EUROPE GENERAL SECRETARY

It is an enormous pleasure and honour for me to introduce our readers to the *Mapping Migration* report, in its fourth edition in 2026.

Like its previous editions, this report presents a snapshot of the engagement of churches and Christian organizations in Europe with the issue of migration and its many facets, first and foremost in working with and for refugees, migrants, and racialized persons.

It does so by highlighting practices of churches that are in many ways typical of activities of churches and Christian organizations across Europe. The examples show the commitment to work with and for migrants across the different groups of migrants and across the different denominations and regions in Europe. They show commitment of old and young, clergy and laity in countries affected by immigration and—often forgotten—emigration. They also hint at the cooperation of persons with and without their own background in migration in the work of churches and Christian organizations.

This report shows the will of churches and Christian organizations to see migration and migrants as an opportunity: an opportunity to show compassion and to offer fellowship, based on the biblical foundations. This is coupled with the recognition of the important contribution migrants have been making and are making to European societies. At the same time, the report gives an account of the challenges associated with migration in a society in which voices that see migration as nothing but a problem become more and more vocal in the media and politics.

Last but not least, this report shows the potential and the benefit of churches and Christian organizations working together in an organization like the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) or the World Council of Churches (WCC). The mutual learning by working across borders, denominations, and other aspects is complemented by the encouragement derived from knowing that the different churches and Christian organizations are working not in isolation but as part of a wide network. This encouragement is particularly important these days, when the news on migration is most of the time very discouraging.

This report will hopefully, like the previous editions, become an important reference for churches and Christian organizations in Europe. However, let me add a brief word of caution: the report does not aim to be fully representative of the work of all churches and Christian organizations in Europe. It is mainly based on the activities in the membership of CCME. It also contains the most recent information and data available at the time the manuscript was completed (December 2025). Some information will, by the time the report is published or read, be outdated, given that migration and churches' responses to it are constantly changing.

This report would not have been possible without the hard work of several people, whom I'd like to thank. First, this includes the authors of the different articles. Lyn van Rooyen and Masiwa Ragies Gunda from the World Council of Churches were once again instrumental in publishing this report as a joint endeavour with the WCC, offering a more global perspective and providing expertise in turning a draft into a publication: all of this was indispensable. Thanks also go to Tim Widmaier, who came in near the end of the process and helped tremendously with tedious but necessary things like checking copyright and graphs. The core person for getting this report together was Kirk Sims, seconded by the United Methodist Church to CCME. His intellectual and theological clarity, perseverance, commitment, and competence are the key to this report.

Thanks so much to all of you.

Thanks also go to the Protestant Church of the Rhineland (EKiR) for financially supporting this publication and the work which went into it.

I hope you find the report informative and inspiring.

Dr Torsten Moritz

CCME General Secretary



FOREWORD FROM THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES GENERAL SECRETARY

In 2020, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) revised, updated, and published their joint study, *Mapping Migration: Mapping Churches' Responses in Europe*. Five years later, we are back with a new edition! I want to thank the CCME secretariat for continuing to draw attention to problems around migrating to Europe, especially for people from the Global Majority.

The WCC acknowledges and proudly embraces the idea of a “migrant faith” because, drawing on resources from ancient Israelite times, we encounter the origins of the Christian faith in the call of Abraham (Gen. 12), whose first assignment was to migrate. Through the generations, Israelites became a migrant people, moving from one place to another in search of better opportunities: food security, economic opportunities, and refuge due to the incessant conflicts in the Promised Land. They also moved internally, especially the pilgrimages to Jerusalem and other central places for worship, religious festivals, and rituals (Amos 5:5, Ex. 23:14-17, Ps. 84:5). The New Testament carries this theme; in fact, the Jesus movement grew because of migration seen especially in the missionary journeys of the Apostle Paul (Acts 13–21). Through these examples, we believe there is no single legitimate reason for migrating. Some migrated to find refuge, others to explore economic opportunities, yet others due to climate emergencies or violent conflicts; still, there were those who migrated to spread the Good News of Jesus Christ, of the triune God.

Beyond biblical times, the Christian faith has grown through the centuries because of the understanding of the close intersection between evangelism and migration, which saw men and women who believed journeying into communities to share God's mission to reconcile humanity and creation to God. Today, this faith is found on all continents, mostly because of migration. As a migrant faith, we unconditionally believe in the sanctity of human dignity and human rights for all, including people on the move and those in new places. There is no justification whatsoever for discriminatory—and, in particular, racially motivated—policies and laws regulating migration where human lives are at stake. The WCC shares in the disappointment of churches and Christians with the increasingly draconian and anti-human dignity

policies and laws being pushed through by the European Union members. The WCC continues to work closely with the CCME, under the theme “Protecting People More than Borders,” in advocating for more humane migration policies and law enforcement to curb the increasing instances of racism in migration policies and law enforcement. The 2023 report of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU, *Being Black in the EU*, clearly shows the increase in anti-Black racism across Europe in the past decade. We know the same has been happening for Asians and Middle Easterners as well.

This new edition will once again draw the attention of Christian actors in Europe, and globally, to the increasingly difficult obstacles being thrown in the face of sisters and brothers who are forced to migrate due to consequences of the climate emergency, violent conflicts, and non-performing economies and who therefore wish to explore their opportunities for refuge, asylum, and better economic opportunities. It cannot be morally acceptable for countries to prioritize exclusionary strategies at the expense of life-saving inclusive strategies, including undoing the legacies of European colonialism. The WCC applauds many churches in Europe and other Christian organizations that continue to be credible, love-driven first responders to people on the move.

I want to encourage our members and partners, especially those in Europe and those from regions from where sisters and brothers are migrating to Europe, to read this resource and plan for strategic and structured interventions to save lives. Protect people more than borders!

Rev. Prof. Dr Jerry Pillay

General Secretary,
World Council of Churches




Mapping Migration, 4th Edition, Voices from the Churches builds upon the rich tradition established by and replicated three times by Darrell Jackson and Alessia Passarelli. This edition has been prepared for church leaders at the denominational, national, and local levels working in congregations, *diakonia*, advocacy, and other parachurch settings. It is an effort to inform them with insights from the churches across Europe and how they have engaged with the complex realities of migration. You will see we have sought to showcase numerous voices from very different theological traditions and backgrounds. We have leaned heavily into case studies with this edition, which are not meant to be comprehensive but representative of different approaches of churches within the European context. We hope that the case studies could seed ideas or inspiration for other church-related entities about ways they could possibly respond in their contexts.

As a place to showcase voices from the churches, this edition is written by church insiders to others inside the church, which distinguishes it from other secular resources. Although you will find rigorously researched articles by academics and others with scholarly credentials, this 4th edition of *Mapping Migration* does not make any pretence of being an academic work, but a highly reflective one by and for practitioners. It presumes an educated audience but does not assume that all of the technical language of migration is known.

I am personally grateful, especially to the Executive Committee of the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, which believed that this should come to fruition again. And I am grateful for the partners in the World Council of Churches who have made the publication a reality. I am also indebted to the authors, all of whom are busy people with many other responsibilities, who made time to contribute to the resource. Nearly all of the authors have experience migrating at some point in their lives, and all have demonstrably evident solidarity with migrants.

It is safe to say that all involved in this project believe in and are committed to the fundamental principle of human dignity. It is our desire that, as people migrate, which is part of the human condition and narrative, for reasons of choice or by force, they will encounter a Europe that has churches that care about and are concerned for their wellbeing and rights.

Kirk Sims



Mapping Migration, 4th Edition, Voices from Churches in Europe documents the evolving role of faith communities as they navigate the complex realities of migration. These essays, case studies, data sets, and maps collected here come out of the experiences of churches as they encounter migrants and wrestle with what welcome and solidarity demand in practice. Migrants from within Europe and from beyond are actively shaping the European landscape.

Across the volume, contributors address the tension between freedom and restriction. European integration has enabled unprecedented freedom of movement for many, reshaping labour markets, congregations, and patterns of everyday life. Particularly along the southern and eastern edges, people on the move have found refuge and exclusion. Several sections expose the gap between migration perceptions and migration realities, showing how public perceptions often diverge from the situations on the ground. By situating their analyses in data and case studies, the contributors challenge simplified narratives that often portray migration as a threat or a burden.

This edition of *Mapping Migration* also highlights the significance of recent displacement crises, especially the migration of large numbers of Ukrainians since February 2022. The activation of temporary protection mechanisms to respond to the largest displacement of people in Europe since the Second World War revealed both the capacity of European institutions for swift, coordinated action and the unevenness of solidarity across different groups of displaced people. Read alongside reflections on the longer Syrian displacement experience, these chapters invite readers to ask difficult questions about selectivity, racialization, and historical memory in European asylum practices. Migration linked to climate change and environmental degradation further expands the horizon of concern, pressing churches and policymakers alike to confront forms of displacement that do not fit neatly into existing legal categories.

Within this complex landscape, *Mapping Migration* calls attention to the role of churches and ecumenical actors. Rather than treating churches merely as service providers or moral commentators, the contributions show them as being embedded in communities that are transformed by migration. Congregational life, patterns of leadership, worship practices, and understandings of unity are reshaped through encounters with migrants and refugees. Several chapters document how Christian fellowship is forged across linguistic, cultural, and confessional boundaries, often in situations of limited resources and ongoing disagreement. This lived ecumenism offers a counter-narrative to polarizing debates within both church and society.

This edition begins with broad themes in migration and those with a migration experience or background, then moves into thinking theologically about migration. After that, you will find case studies that highlight Christian unity, *diakonia*, and advocacy.

This volume is intended as a resource for church leaders and practitioners who seek to understand and respond faithfully to migration in their contexts. As you read through *Mapping Migration*, listen to these voices from the churches, and may they inspire a response of welcome, embrace, or advocacy in your context.



MAJOR MIGRATORY THEMES IN EUROPE TODAY

Migration is a fundamental part of the human story, but to understand it today, we have to look closely at how it is unfolding across Europe. Over the next few articles, we will step into the realities of the Syrian and Ukrainian displacements and the challenges at the southern border. We will also address the prejudice many face upon arrival, while highlighting some policies that have been proven to actually work, the European Union's Freedom of Movement policy and the Temporary Protection Directive that was invoked in 2022 for the first time. At the end of this section, we will see pages of country-specific data so we can see how the countries of Europe compare.





FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi

All EU citizens and their family members have the right to move and reside freely within the EU. This fundamental right is established by Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 45 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC outlines the conditions for EU citizens and their family members to exercise the right of free movement and residence within member states:

- EU citizens can reside in another EU country for up to three months with only a valid identity card or passport.
- Staying in another EU country for over three months requires meeting specific conditions based on their status (e.g., worker, self-employed, student) and complying with administrative formalities.
- EU citizens can attain the right of permanent residence in another EU country after legally residing there continuously for five years.
- Family members, whether EU citizens or non-EU nationals, have the right to accompany or join EU citizens, subject to certain conditions or formalities.

TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi

Temporary protection serves as an extraordinary measure to provide immediate and short-term shelter for displaced persons in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx from non-EU countries, where the individuals cannot return to their home country. The 2001 Temporary Protection Directive offers the European Union a mechanism to address such scenarios.

This directive comes into effect when the European Council, based on a proposal from the European Commission, determines that a mass influx poses a risk to the standard asylum system's ability to handle the demand arising from the arrival of displaced persons, potentially impacting the system's efficiency.

The Temporary Protection Directive was first activated by the Council in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, offering swift and effective aid to those fleeing the conflict.

The unprecedented scale of displaced individuals from Ukraine created a risk that EU asylum systems would struggle to process applications promptly, affecting efficiency and the rights of those seeking international


protection. Following a call from Home Affairs ministers on 2 March 2022, the Commission promptly proposed activating the Directive; on 4 March 2022, the Council unanimously adopted the decision, granting yearly temporary protection rights to individuals escaping the war in Ukraine.

The Directive has been extended and now applies until 4 March 2027. Under the newly approved framework, the European Council calls on Member States to begin transitioning beneficiaries of temporary protection who fled the war in Ukraine and received protection under the Directive to alternative residence statuses. These may include residence permits based on employment, training, education, or family grounds, provided the individuals meet the relevant conditions. At the same time, Member States are encouraged to support reintegration by allowing exploratory visits and coordinating voluntary return programmes with Ukraine. They may also create EU-funded Unity Hubs to provide documentation, job guidance, and return planning, once the recommendation is formally adopted.



Ukrainians who benefit from temporary protection in the EU

Data representing 4.2 million people as of November 2023



Rights of Beneficiaries of Temporary Protection

- Residence permit for the entire duration of protection (lasting from one to three years).
- Adequate information about temporary protection. Guarantees for access to the asylum procedure.
- Access to employment, subject to relevant professional rules, national labour market policies, and general employment conditions.
- Access to suitable accommodation or housing.
- Access to social welfare or means of subsistence, if necessary.
- Access to medical care.
- Access to education for individuals under 18 within the state education system.
- Opportunities for family reunification in certain circumstances.
- Access to banking services, including opening a basic bank account.
- Ability to move to another EU country before the

issuance of a residence permit.

- Freedom of movement within EU countries (excluding the Member State of residence) for 90 days within a 180-day period after receiving a residence permit in the host EU country.

The Directive provides temporary residence permits based on group legal status, allowing displaced individuals to avoid prolonged stays in camps while awaiting protection assessments. The Council Implementing Decision also permits Ukrainians to move freely within the EU, preventing forced detention and reliance on smuggling networks.

While the Directive demonstrates an effective, protective framework, some Member States have begun imposing restrictions on these measures, potentially undermining beneficiaries' rights and protection standards.

EUROPE “PROTECTING PEOPLE MORE THAN BORDERS”: CHALLENGING THE CURRENT “REALISM” DISCOURSE AND LASTING MYTHS

Torsten Moritz

Based on recent news reports, it is clear that the current asylum and migration system is not very humane. In fact, it is causing suffering, brutality, and death while at the same time making smugglers and the so-called security industry rich.

When advocates for human rights-oriented policies criticize this and make suggestions about how things could work differently, we often hear that we are unrealistic. The interesting phenomenon is that the current immigration system is based on many assumptions, which are not always supported by facts. Large parts of European asylum and migration policies are based on myths and misleading discourses. Even more, many of the policies which have been carried out for two decades have never been examined, especially if they fulfil their own success criteria by reducing the number of arrivals of asylum seekers in Europe.

Some of these have been summarized by Hein de Haas in his enlightening book *How Migration Really Works*,¹ which debunks some of the myths in public debates. I must also admit that some of his conclusions challenge the

messages communicated by those of us in the humanitarian community.

Myth: We need to reduce asylum to reduce migration.

How many first-time residence permits did the EU issue in 2023? 3.7 million.²

How many of them were refugees or others under international protection? About a quarter or less.³

What was the main reason for granting these residence permits? Employment, with 33.8%.⁴ The fastest-growing reason is education.⁵

The largest nationalities receiving first-time residence permits in 2023 were Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Indians. For all of these groups, employment was the main purpose at 72%, 53%, and 46%, respectively.⁶ See Table 1.⁷




Table 1. Top 10 citizenships granted first residence permits in the EU, 2023



Myths of mass irregular entry: How many of the asylum seekers entered irregularly?

Asylum applications 2023 according to EUAA: 1,140,000.⁸

Irregular EU border-crossing entries according to FRONTEX: 380,000.⁹

Two-thirds of asylum applicants enter regularly.¹⁰

It might be useful to look beyond asylum and beyond irregular entry.

We can certainly argue that those seeking asylum and in irregular situations are likely to be most vulnerable and need specific attention, but if we look at social integration, the job goes far beyond recognized refugees and asylum seekers.

It is also a reminder that our own analysis needs to be modified. It is no longer the case that there is *no* possibility of coming to Europe legally; rather, there is a wide range of mini-programmes with very specific target groups. This is not something the average person wanting to come to Europe understands, nor is it something the authorities in European countries understand. It is high time for some transparency.

Myth: Asylum applicants are not getting refugee status.

The EUAA for 2022 speaks of an initial recognition of 39% at first instance but adds that with national humanitarian status taken into account, the quota is more than 50%.¹¹ This does not take into consideration the recognition at a later instance, usually as a result of a court decision. Having precise figures for the appropriate year here is difficult, but it is realistic to think that in the end, between 60 and 65% of asylum applicants get protection status.¹²

Myth: "Pull factors" work, and social benefits are responsible for migration.

A common myth is that elements like social security transfers or other reception benefits, such as an early opportunity to take up work, attract people to migrate to Europe. Several studies have found no such correlation.¹³ In a study on refugees' choice of destinations, Valentina Di Iasio and Jackline Wahba from Southampton University conclude that "policies that restrict access to [the] welfare system or to the labour market have [a] modest impact and therefore are not very effective in terms of reducing the number of asylum applicants."¹⁴ Existing networks play a strong role, as do processing time and recognition rates.

Myth (or rather illusion): It's better to help in the region. We are welcoming the whole world.

Most of the world's refugees are, as a matter of fact, in the region or internally displaced, with UNHCR estimating 69% are in neighbouring countries, often low- to middle-income countries.¹⁵ Countries like Uganda, South Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Lebanon are shouldering a lot of responsibility.¹⁶ Despite the verbal commitment to help in the region, little is done to help.

A sad example of the hypocrisy surrounding the issue of "protection in the region" is the displacement from Sudan, currently the largest refugee movement in the world. On 16 April 2024, an international donor conference was supposed to collect 4.1 billion US dollars (approx. 3.7 billion euros) for protecting displaced people in Sudan and neighbouring countries. But only 2 billion US dollars was collected.¹⁷ The disappointment over this fatal development is all the greater when you consider that in March, the EU signed an agreement for support totalling 7.4 billion euros with Egypt alone, from what is known, with one of the main goals being limiting migration.¹⁸

If protection in the region is to work, it needs proper resources and real, viable options for enough people to stay

and live in the region, for those fleeing or migrating. The current hope that substandard makeshift arrangements without any personal development prospects will keep people in the region in the long run will backfire.

Myth: Immigration restrictions reduce migration.

In Europe, we have what one might call “communicating tubes” or what de Haas refers to as the “waterbed effect.” In other words, if there are fewer persons on one migration route, there are more on another one.¹⁹ In Europe, the Eastern and the Central Mediterranean, together with Spain/Morocco and the Canary Islands, are such a context, as are most recently the Eastern borders. There may be a temporary reduction on one route, even overall, but usually after a year or two, overall levels are the same, even though routes might have changed. After some more years, some migration returns to the old route. This could, for example, be seen with the so-called Balkan route after the EU–Turkey deal, which brought about an initial drop in persons crossing: a shift of similar populations to, for example, the central Mediterranean route.

Arrivals are inevitable as long as the root causes exist.

Myth: Poverty is the main cause of South–North migration.

The poorest of the poor don’t migrate; they die or, at best, move to a nearby place. It is rather an investment from persons or families with some means to migrate or to put resources together to have a family member migrate. As mentioned before, that calls into question whether sanctions on development cooperation are a useful tool. It also explains why the idea that migrants who have not achieved legal status or substantial wealth as a result of their migration might simply go back to where they came from.²⁰

Myth: Using development aid can motivate the cooperation of third countries.

In many debates on cooperation with third countries, the EU and European countries often contemplate a stick and carrot strategy on development cooperation with countries from which Europe expects migration cooperation. Recent examples such as Tunisia or Niger, however, show that these countries often interpret the agreement differently or experience instability due to the cooperation.²¹

The threat to cut development aid overlooks that most of the countries with which Europe engages in development cooperation are not those of the strongest

interest for Europe. In the few cases where recipients of development aid are interesting migration partners, the remittances of those who have migrated are as important as or more important than official development cooperation.²²

Myth: Global migration is not at an all-time high.

De Haas shows that absolute numbers of migrants indeed have increased, but that this is in line with the increase in the world population. The percentage of migrants among the world population has been relatively stable since the 1960s: around 2.5 to 3.5% of the world population.²³ He notes that migration patterns have become more complex and diversified but also explains that the narrative of the monolithic, non-diverse old societies is a myth.

Similarly, the UNHCR reports 117.3 million people being forcibly displaced worldwide, up from around 40 million 15 years ago. There is indeed an increase among internationally displaced, as some conflicts and the displacement have become more protracted, but the biggest increase is among those internally displaced—those not leaving their country. This is partly a real increase, but it is also due to UNHCR taking statistics more seriously in recent years. It was only from the late 1990s onward that UNHCR officially started to work on and count internally displaced.

The bottom line is that we need to take a closer factual look and also challenge myths if we want migration to be humane and a success for those migrating and those hosting them.

UKRAINIAN MIGRATION IN EUROPE SINCE FEBRUARY 2022

Kirk Sims

Early in the morning of 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the commencement of a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Shortly after that, the three largest Ukrainian cities, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa, and parts of the Donbas were shaken. Russian troops entered Ukrainian territory from the north, south, and east; soon, all-out war ensued that “triggered the fastest-growing and largest displacement crisis in Europe since World War II.”²⁴ At least 6,168,000 displaced persons were registered in some capacity in all other European countries,²⁵ and there were around 3,700,000 internally displaced persons in Ukraine.²⁶

With the onslaught, Ukrainians, especially from the Donbas region, but also other parts of Ukraine, began to flee occupied territories, those under missile strikes, or those near the fighting. Some fled within Ukraine, and others went to Russia and Belarus. Within just a few weeks, millions of Ukrainians crossed the borders into neighbouring states of Moldova and the EU countries of Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary.²⁷

The leaders of the European Union states responded quickly to activate the never-before-used Temporary Protection Directive that had been adopted in 2001. The Directive gave the countries in the EU a common approach to address the crisis, rather than a patchwork of approaches by country. This legal framework gave displaced Ukrainians immediate legal residence status, the right to work, and access to healthcare, education, and other social assistance.²⁸ It first came into force on 4 March 2022 and was extended two more times, with effect until at least 4 March 2027.²⁹ Eurostat reports that by September 2025, 4.3 million Ukrainians held temporary protection status across the countries of the EU,³⁰ essentially the equivalent of the population of the EU states of Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta combined.³¹ The Directive has been evaluated as a positive collective response of the European Union.³²

In the days since the initial waves into the EU, many of these Ukrainians have taken advantage of these rights given to them and have found longer-term scenarios; some






Figure 1. Non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine and were under temporary protection at the end of September 2025

have moved on to other countries, where they have found opportunities for work, housing, and community with other diasporic Ukrainians. Germany and Poland both have over a million Ukrainians with temporary protection. It must also be noted that regarding the proportion of the population, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia have borne a higher rate, as seen in Figure 1.³³

Male Ukrainian nationals between ages 18 and 60 were restricted from leaving the country during the bulk of the war,³⁴ creating a significant demographic imbalance toward women, children, and elderly among those who have received temporary protection in the EU. Many of the school-age children have integrated into local school systems, but others have opted for hybrid learning systems based in Ukraine. Many Ukrainians have found jobs in

healthcare, hospitality, manufacturing, transportation/logistics, and ICT/IT sectors.³⁵ However, some have had issues with credential recognition in certain specialized professions, such as medicine, engineering, and law.

Over the last few years, the Ukrainian population has integrated into the job markets and school systems. Many of them have also gathered into diasporic communities, which may be evident with the presence of Ukrainian supermarkets and worship services.

It is still to be determined if, after the war, those Ukrainians who lost their homes or are from inaccessible areas will return en masse. What is likely is that the more significant Ukrainian presence in the rest of Europe brought about by the war will remain a more visible part of the multicultural tapestries of Europe.

PELMENĚ
KOŇAKY
KAVIÁRY
VODKA
KVAS
BONBÓNY
ČAJE
RYBY
 (SUŠENÉ, UZENÉ, MRAŽENÉ)

OTEVÍRACÍ DOBA
 Po-Pá 9:00-20:00
 So 10:00-19:00
 Ne 12:00-18:00

www.p10...mality.cz

BA MOVA BA
SPECIALITY
 UKRAJINSKÉ, MOLDAVSKÉ, KAVKAZSKÉ

UKRAJINIAN SUPERMARKET
 (Ukrainian flag)

OTEVŘENO

9-20
 10-19
 12-18

HEKLI
 95 45
 195
 142
 35
 69 189
 35
 35
 189
 30 28

Figure 3. Ukrainian supermarket in Prague



The Mediterranean Sea and a complex neighbourhood of countries around it make up Europe's southern border. Migration in the region is often characterized as irregular and mixed. *Irregular migration* refers to people in mobility who lack legal documents and/or use unofficial avenues of movement such as smuggling and trafficking networks. *Mixed migration* is a global reality that refers to people moving along the same routes across international borders for various reasons and with different statuses. Mixed migration in the Mediterranean region distinguishes these migrants from those who enter other parts of Europe, such as those from Ukraine who have a common migrant status connected to the war.

The mixed flows of migration in the Mediterranean region highlight the dynamic nature of people moving across the region for multiple reasons in response to policies, security conditions, socio-economic developments, and other factors. An unofficial boat crossing the sea will likely have refugees fleeing war, those seeking asylum, and others wanting economic opportunity or family reunification. The characterization of mixed and irregular migration in the region underlines that while the boats represent unofficial and illegal avenues of migration, the people in the boats have valid migration concerns.

Figure 1 shows the context of irregular migration in relation to regular legal migration in Europe. The graph shows the number of migrants from non-EU countries who obtained EU residence permits in past years. Most came through regular legal channels of migration such as work, family, or education, while a small portion came through irregular channels. For example, in 2023, the

irregular migrants were approximately 7% of the total who received resident permits.

According to the estimates in the *Atlas of Migration 2024*, there were on average 719,000 first-time asylum applications during the four years from 2020 to 2024. Similarly, the estimates in Figure 1 show that approximately 250,000 people crossed the southern border each year during the same period (2020–24). Based on these estimates, unofficially, around a quarter of the asylum seekers between 2020 and 2024 arrived through the Southern Europe/Mediterranean region. These numbers illustrate that while migration issues in the Mediterranean region represent a major concern in Europe, they form a relatively small part of the overall picture of migration in Europe.

However, this should not diminish the significance of these migration flows. Migration in the region is dynamic due to its mixed nature. The migration groups are difficult to define and characterize because they do not fit immediately into accepted categories. The main countries of origin in 2024 include the Syrian Arab Republic, Mali, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, which illustrates further the mixed nature of migrants in the region.

The flows of mixed migrants are often comprised of the most vulnerable people with the least access to human rights, peace, and security. These migrants are on the most forgotten and vulnerable end of migration, where there are no categories or laws for support or protection.




Figure 1. First-time resident permits in the EU between 2014 and 2023




Figure 2. Map of migrant routes along Europe's southern border

The sea crossings make migration in this region particularly visible, dangerous, and highly debated. The map in Figure 2 shows the four main migrant routes along Europe's southern border and the number of people who crossed in 2024. Not shown on the map is a transit route into Europe over land from Turkey through the Western Balkans corridor: in 2024, 32,881 migrants were registered along this route in the Western Balkans.

Figure 3 illustrates the number of crossings on each route between 2016 and 2024, along with the fatalities and failed attempts. In 2024, more than 208,000 migrants arrived in Southern Europe: 90% of these crossings used the four sea routes, with approximately 10% taking a land route. According to the missing migrants project, 32,893 migrants have died in the Mediterranean region since 2014.³⁶ Coupled with the efforts to intercept or push back the boats, the crossings are becoming more difficult. In 2024, around 40% of the attempted crossings ended in a fatality or return to the departure country, increasing the amount of exploitation and danger.



Figure 3. Attempts, failures, and fatalities on Europe's southern border

Migrants across the region already flee violence and abuse, go through family separation, and experience painful and dangerous journeys. Deadly boat crossings only add to the deluge of trauma that migrants carry. This trauma will show up later as the migrants settle in the EU, and it will surely need attention and healing. The problems that accompany mixed migration—such as trauma, abuse, violence, exploitation, and isolation—often follow migrants into their settlement countries. These cycles need to be broken.

Much of the recent EU migration policy has sought to address issues related to the southern border. The Pact on Migration and Asylum, established in 2020 and approved

in 2024, has been shaped by the EU's concern to reduce the irregular flows of migrants into the EU, increase the number of returns, and create pathways for development and for needed migrants to fill certain jobs. The EU–Turkey deal in 2017 set a precedent for transactional and incentive-related agreements with third-party states. Agreements and partnerships have since developed with other countries in the region. These deals reflect at least two aspects of the new Pact that unfold directly on Europe's southern border region: increased protection of the border and the externalization of migration control. These efforts have linked EU aid to cooperation on issues such as border controls, outfitting the Libyan Coast Guard, and, most recently, external hubs in third countries for processing asylum claims.

Efforts like this attempt to turn the tide of migration along the southern border. Besides questions of legality, they raise concerns about accountability and transparency as well as the question of how third-party countries will maintain EU values and guard against *refoulement* and human rights abuse. Does the Pact fall into the usual rut of trying to solve migration as a problem, or does it find ways to empower the agency and resourcefulness of the region and the migrants themselves? New asylum and management regulations will replace the Dublin system for sorting and registering asylum applications in the first arrival country. However, like the Dublin system, administrative breakdowns and bottlenecks, along with migrant efforts to evade the system, will lead to continued problems.

Instead, Europe needs to approach migration as a complex dynamic phenomenon of human mobility and European growth and not as a problem to keep out. Important aspects for a realistic perspective of migration in the region include:

- Clear and accessible data to dispel misunderstandings.
- Policy and systems guided by a strong moral compass rooted in European values and backed by the rule of law.
- More diverse pathways of migration that relate to what drives mobility and that empower everyone.
- Concern to break the negative cycles migrants experience, which continue after their arrival in Europe.
- Early engagement of major stakeholders to address migration issues proactively, such as language learning, integration awareness, and capacity building.
- Diaspora involvement, including faith communities, to restore hope and resilience.
- Organizations and partners who are best positioned to share EU values, protect dignity, and build credibility needed for regular, safe, controlled, and functioning avenues of migration.

Concerns such as these will protect the EU from falling into the rut of trying to solve migration as a problem. They will help to turn the narrative and focus of migration away from the unwanted and destructive issues toward the motivation, agency, and resourcefulness of the region and the migrants themselves.



THE SYRIAN MIGRATION EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE

Mor Polycarpus Dr Augin Aydin

The past decade has witnessed one of the largest displacement crises in modern history, as millions of Syrians have fled war, persecution, and economic destruction. The European response to this migration has been complex, shaped by political debates, humanitarian efforts, and evolving policies. At the heart of this crisis, however, are human lives—families seeking safety, children longing for stability, and communities striving to rebuild their futures in new lands.

Syrians form one of the largest refugee groups in Europe today. While the exact numbers fluctuate, the European Union has received over a million asylum applications from Syrians since the beginning of the war in 2011.³⁷ Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands³⁸ have been among the most significant host nations, offering legal pathways to integration, including asylum, temporary protection, and family reunification programmes. However, the road to stability is laden with challenges. Many refugees arrive with limited resources, facing language barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, and difficulties in employment. Moreover, the trauma of war and displacement has left deep scars, requiring not only economic support but also psychological and spiritual care.

Churches across Europe have played a necessary role in welcoming and supporting Syrian refugees. Their response has gone beyond material aid, encompassing legal advocacy, language training, and community-building initiatives. Faith communities have provided a crucial space where displaced Syrians can find not only shelter but also dignity and belonging. Local congregations, in partnership with ecumenical organizations, have facilitated job placements, offered pastoral care, and even adapted liturgical practices to accommodate Arabic- and Syriac-speaking Christians who fled persecution in their homeland.³⁹

One particularly inspiring aspect of the church's response has been the revival of faith traditions among Syrian Christian refugees. Many who had been disconnected from their heritage in Syria have found a renewed sense of identity and community within European churches. The Syrian Orthodox diaspora, for instance, has established new parishes, preserving liturgical traditions while fostering intergenerational connections between older migrants and younger Syrians raised in Europe. This integration has not been without difficulties, as newly arrived refugees often struggle to reconcile



their cultural backgrounds with their host societies. Yet, through sustained pastoral engagement, many have found ways to navigate their dual identities as both Syrians and Europeans.

Despite the generosity of many churches and organizations, challenges remain. Rising anti-migrant sentiments in parts of Europe,⁴⁰ coupled with shifting asylum policies, have made long-term integration difficult for many Syrian families. Additionally, economic downturns and political instability in host countries have sometimes strained the resources available for refugee support. Nevertheless, the resilience of Syrian migrants, coupled with the unwavering commitment of faith communities, continues to inspire hope.

As Europe moves forward, the Syrian migration experience offers critical lessons on hospitality, justice, and the role of faith in rebuilding lives. The church remains a beacon of hope in this journey, reminding the world that every displaced person carries not just a story of loss, but also one of perseverance, culture, and faith. It is in this spirit that we must continue to walk alongside them, not merely as aid providers but as true brothers and sisters in Christ.

MIGRATION, CLIMATE EMERGENCY, AND RACISM: DECOLONIZING MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE

Masiwa Ragies Gunda

The planet is facing an increasingly unpredictable and racially prejudiced climate emergency manifesting through frequent severe droughts, floods, storms, and sinking homelands (rising sea levels). These natural disasters have led to economic challenges, putting significant pressure on developing economies to provide opportunities for citizens. Struggles for resources have also led to many violent conflicts and wars, which have often affected vulnerable people. The climate emergency and economic inequalities have often demonstrated racial prejudice in the ways in which they affect racialized peoples, Africans, Asians, Middle Easterners, and Indigenous peoples globally. These life-threatening challenges have seen a significant increase in people on the move seeking refuge, asylum, and economic opportunities in fairly peaceful environments.

A majority of people on the move tend to seek refuge within their national boundaries, some with their regional neighbours (sub-regional or continental); however, a significant number of people from Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern and Central Europe have been seeking new homes in Central and Western Europe. The Mediterranean Sea has been used by many to access European destinations. People fleeing conflicts, climate emergency consequences, and lack of economic opportunities risk their lives in the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The colonial legacy of European-created narratives continues to paint Europe as the place of fair opportunities, peaceful existence, and greater opportunities for realizing one's potential. Migration into Europe is indeed part of colonial legacies (coloniality).

European responses to increased traffic from people coming from formerly colonized lands have constantly demonstrated the continuing legacies of European colonial heritage, in which Europe was entitled to be wherever Europe chose while restricting access into its own territories. As Europe tightens its border controls through various mechanisms, including the recently ratified Pact on Migration and Asylum,⁴¹ it shows how Europe continues to emphasize protecting its borders at the expense of human life, especially when the European Union is outsourcing its border management to the Maghreb states⁴² and criminalizing those rescuing migrants at sea.⁴³ The Mediterranean Sea continues to witness thousands of deaths of Africans, Middle Easterners, and Asians trying to reach Europe. The compassion that followed the arrival

of Ukrainian refugees clearly demonstrated how racially prejudiced European migration policies and practices are.

The 2023 report of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU, *Being Black in the EU*, clearly shows the increase in anti-Black racism across Europe in the past decade. Some of the statistics in this report make it apparent that racism undergirds the experiences of migrants, especially for people of African descent (Black people). Between 2016 and 2022, 47% felt discriminated against: "While the average 12-month prevalence of discrimination on any ground was 17% for the general population in the EU-27 based on a 2019 Eurobarometer survey on discrimination in the EU, it was 36% for people of African descent in the 2022 survey."⁴⁴ The experience and perception of racism and discrimination discourage victims and survivors from reporting their experiences: only 9% reported to law enforcement, while 4% approached equality bodies. At 12%, women tend to report more than men, at 6%, showing also the legacies of the colonial criminalization of African masculinity.⁴⁵

As churches, ecumenical bodies, mission agencies, specialized ministries, and people of goodwill, we are called to participate in God's mission (*missio Dei*) to reconcile God, humanity, and God's creation into a harmonious coexistence. Under the circumstances, we are called to advocate in our local contexts for the rights of migrants and people on the move, on the primacy of human life over all other considerations.



The old cemetery of Lampedusa holds a space to honour the memory of the ones who lost their lives trying to reach Europe through the sea. Crosses made with pieces from the boats carrying refugees mark the graveyard of dozens of unidentified bodies. In the first 5 months of 2022, Lampedusa recorded the arrival of over 6,000 migrants to the island.



COUNTRY PROFILES AND MIGRANT INFOGRAPHICS

The following country profile data pages attempt to give a broad overview of some major trends in the countries of Europe. These country pages build upon the data sets presented in the previous editions of *Mapping Migration*. We have sought to harmonize the set with the previous editions, which previously included “each member state of the Council of Europe (plus Belarus).” Since the publication of the last edition, Russia has been expelled from the Council of Europe. Although some questions about reporting on migration arise with regard to Russia, it remains the country in Europe with the largest land area and population, so it is logical to include it in this broad survey. A few microstates in the Council of Europe were excluded in the previous editions, and those have been added. However, other non-members, such as the microstate of Vatican City and the mostly Central Asian country of Kazakhstan, were excluded. Primarily because of a lack of robust data sets, states with limited recognition have also been excluded, but may be subsumed into the data of other countries. Many European countries have a wide range of relationships with their political entities beyond the European metropole. These range from a high level of autonomy to full political integration, with territories being inside Europe and municipalities and non-European regions fully integrated into the metropole. In places of occupation, we have taken no stance with regard to the data, but present the data as they have been received by the reporting entity. Furthermore, no intentional political statement is being made by any map in this volume. Any representation of a border on a map does not constitute legal or official political recognition of that boundary by the authors, the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe or the World Council of Churches.

We determined that finding robust comparable data sets that are up to date and representative of our entire set was a difficult task. First of all, some of the types of data were out of date. For example, a rich study that was used in the past was the Pew Research Center's *Faith on the Move: The Religious Affiliation of International Migrants*, which mapped the religiosity of migrants. Unfortunately, this has not been replicated since it was published in 2012. Additionally, much of the data from the World Christian Database and the World Religion Database includes projections as of 2020, with data being collected at some time in the past. Other studies go through cycles that also need to be updated. We tried to only include data from the last couple of years, with just a few exceptions that go a little beyond that.

Secondly, we have further decided that we want to use data that could be applicable to most of the 48 states in this report. Although some rich data sets exist from Eurostat, it was decided not to include only 27, or as many as 33, if the other EFTA countries and EU candidate countries were included. This limited set within a set would produce too many blank data sets in the country data pages. However, we deemed some in these categories as very important to include. These sets can be found after the country profile pages.

Thirdly, we would say that some data sets are not like comparing apples to oranges, but more akin to different varieties of apples, since methodologies, definitions, and timing of data collection have nuanced differences between countries. Some movements of people have been very fluid (especially with regard to the categorisation and locations of displaced Ukrainians) and have been difficult to pinpoint with 100 per cent accuracy. However, the data presented here represent the best numbers we have been able to secure at the time of print.

With caution, artificial intelligence through ChatGPT was employed in some of the data collection and presentation. It was found to be immensely helpful in extracting data from enormous spreadsheets (with as many as 22,000 rows) and to verify the accuracy of other sets. The sets that employed AI assistance were then audited by the editor, and the extractions and syntheses were found to be accurate. The extent of AI assistance used in each set is disclosed in the description of each data set.

Here are the sets presented in our country pages.



Total Population, 2026: The projected population as of 1 January 2026.



Net Number of Migrants, 2026: The projected total number of immigrants (people moving into a country) minus the total number of emigrants (people moving out of a country) for 2026.



Net Migration Rate (per 1,000 population): The annual net gain or loss of population due to migration for every 1,000 people living in that country, projected for 2026.



Total Fertility Rate (TFR): The average number of children a woman would have over her lifetime, given the current birth rates of each age group. The replacement fertility rate is 2.1 per woman. The number presented is the projected number for the country in 2026.

These data sets come from the “World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition,” published by the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024) and can be found at these links at the time of compilation:

https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2024_ims_stock_by_sex_and_destination.xlsx.

[https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1_Indicator%20\(Standard\)/EXCEL_FILES/1_General/WPP2024_GEN_F01_DEMOGRAPHIC_INDICATORS_FULL.xlsx](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1_Indicator%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_General/WPP2024_GEN_F01_DEMOGRAPHIC_INDICATORS_FULL.xlsx). They all use the medium variants, and AI was used to extract these data.



Immigrants (in-migrants) total: The total number of foreign-born persons currently living in the destination country as of mid-year 2024.



Migrants as % of population: The percentage of a country's total population who were born in a different country, as of mid-year 2024.



Emigrants (out-migrants) total: People born in this country who have left to live in another country (at mid-year). These are international migrants *from* this country living in other countries.



Emigrants as % of the total population: Percentage of people born in this country as a share of the resident population of the country as of mid-year 2024.

“International Migrant Stock 2024,” from the United

Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Direct links could be found at the time of compilation: https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesapd_2024_ims_stock_by_sex_and_destination.xlsx https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesapd_2024_ims_stock_by_sex_destination_and_origin.xlsx.

“Emigrants as % of the total population” was calculated with the assistance of ChatGPT.



Registered victims of trafficking with most recent year of reporting: Individuals who have been formally identified as victims of trafficking by national authorities or recognized anti-trafficking organizations during the year of reporting. These figures were extracted with the help of ChatGPT and the reports are available at <https://data.unodc.org/> and <https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-trafficking-persons>.



Key multinational agreements: These are key relevant human rights-oriented multinational agreements that are relevant for migrants. The year the country signed, acceded, or had the document come into force is listed. These have been printed in previous editions and were cross-checked with ChatGPT.

- **European Social Charter:** (1961, ETS No.035) — Signature date
- **European Social Charter, Revised:** (Revised, CETS No.163) — Signature date
- **Legal Status of Migrant Workers:** (ETS No.093) — Signature date
- **European Convention on Human Rights:** (ETS No.005) — Signature date
- **Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings:** (CETS No.197) — In force date
- **1951 UN Refugee Convention:** — Signature/ Accession date

Religious identification of migrants: The religious identity of the percentage of immigrants in the country.

- ✚ % Christian
- ☪ % Muslim
- ☸ % Hindu
- ✡ % Jewish
- 🌀 % Buddhist
- 🗎 % Other Religions
- ⦿ % Unaffiliated

Because governments do not universally track religious identification or affiliation, for comparable data, it is necessary to look to independent studies. This Pew report is the most recent. The data can be accessed here:

<https://www.pewresearch.org/dataset/dataset-religious-composition-of-the-worlds-migrants-1990-2020/>.

Some additional data sets presented in this section come from Wave 7 of the World Values Survey that ended in 2022. These questions were chosen because the data are available for most of the countries in our set and for their relevance to engagement with migrants. As many, but far from most, migrants belong to religions that differ from the typical religions of historic populations, we present results of the level of trust of people of another religion. Assessing nativism, we also present results from a question about job scarcity: Employers should give priority to (nation) people over immigrants. A final question from the World Values Survey is an assessment of residents of a country about the impact of immigrants on the development of the country. You will find the original data from the World Values Survey here: <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV7.jsp>.

Albania



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

2,761,147

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026 **-22,595**



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION) **-8.2**



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.323 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **46,377**



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

1.7



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,216,628



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

43.6



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

112



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1998
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	2007
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1995
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1992

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

44.7%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
3.3	5.4	25.7	36.7	25.6

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

13.8%



Andorra



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

83,352

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

751

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

8.96

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.105

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

-

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

-

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,982


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

2.4

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

<5

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2021**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2000
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1994
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2011
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	-

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"
(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

56.9%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
0.4	3.1	20.7	45.5	30

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"
(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

51.8%

Armenia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

2,941,486

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

-27,000

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION) **-9.12**



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.712 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

274,645

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

9.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

637,604

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

21.4

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

13

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2021**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2001
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	2001
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"
(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **29.8%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
4.5	9.2	38.8	32.1	11.8

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

15.9%

Austria



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

9,110,277

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

13,212

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

1.451

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.336

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

2,327,064

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

25.5

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

430,560

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

4.7

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

450


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1963
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1999
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1957
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

49.3%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
10.1	23.6	39.9	21.9	3.4

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

29.2%



Azerbaijan



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

10,427,060

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

7,708

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

0.737

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.662

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

218,460

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

2.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

810,116

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

7.8

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

94



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2001
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	2001
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2010
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

24.9%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
6.9	11	42	24.1	6.3

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

2%



Belarus



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

8,967,712

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026
-3,608

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)
-0.404

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
1.234
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL
1,054,604

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION
11.6

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL
790,232

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION
8.7

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING
210

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2014
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	2001

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"
(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
38.5%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)
MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
2.8	11.8	59.7	14.6	3.2

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"
(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)
9%

Belgium



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

11,767,361

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

29,607

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

2.514

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.397 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

2,349,032

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

20

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

521,884


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

4.4

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

231

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1978
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

24.9%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Bosnia and Herzegovina



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

3,127,365

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



-7,581

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

-2.434

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.502

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



-

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



-

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,608,324



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

50.8




REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

38



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

50.7%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
25.5	24.3	37.2	7.2	2.7

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

4.7%



Bulgaria



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

6,691,964

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026 **-5,722**



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026 (PER 1,000 POPULATION) **-0.858**



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN) **1.741**
REPLACEMENT = 2.1




IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **299,100**



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION **4.4**




EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **1,252,234**



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION **18.5**



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING **153**
YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1998
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1992
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION" (TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **41.2%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)
MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
13.3	20.2	48.6	8	1.7

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS" (3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

5.4%



Croatia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)




TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.472

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

826,166

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

21.3

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

29



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1999
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2009
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1996
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	-

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

60.8%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
7.7	22.2	47	12.3	1.3

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

19.3%



Cyprus



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

1,376,781

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

7,210

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

5.216

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.366 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

202,062

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

14.9

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

80,760


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

5.9

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

16

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1967
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1961
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1963

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"
(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **25.2%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
9.5	22.5	48.9	15.9	1


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

10.3%



Czechia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

10,538,315

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

13,400

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

1.273

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.474

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,025,199

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

9.5

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

583,214

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION


5.4

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

14

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2021



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1992
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2017
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

44.6%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
16.1	23.1	40.6	12.6	4.5


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

8.8%



Denmark



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

6,014,093

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

18,360

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

3.048

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.524 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

847,475

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

14.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

124,665


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

2.1

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

73

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY




"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
7.2	21	45.6	21	3.9

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)



Estonia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026




NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL




EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1998
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1993
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2015
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1997

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

52.5%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
5.8	19.8	52.3	14.7	2

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

15.7%



Finland



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

5,624,082

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

12,666

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

2.253

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.304 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

514,432

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

9.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

181,834


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

3.2

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

239

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1990
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1989
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2012
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1968

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

74.3%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
5.2	14.2	43.8	30	4.6


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

31.5%



France



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

66,700,707

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



88,533

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



1.326

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



1.637

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



9,186,757

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



13.8

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



2,547,158

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



3.8


REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

2,027




YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1982
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1952

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

62.5%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
8.6	16.8	45.8	20.7	5.9


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

40%



Georgia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

3,805,841

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

1,215

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

0.319

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.776 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

81,582

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

2.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

496,486

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

13

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

6

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2020**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2000
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1999
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1999

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

38.4%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
8.1	13.5	48.2	16.8	8.4

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

8%



Germany



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

83,741,228

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



158,442

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



1.894

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.46

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

16,750,084

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

19.8

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

4,297,233

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION


5.1

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

<5


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2007
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1953
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2013
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

53.7%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
6.3	24.4	39.2	23	3.9

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

49.4%



Greece



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

9,918,577

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

14,649

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

1.48

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.343 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,423,964

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

14.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

780,112


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

7.8

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING


358

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2014
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1952

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"
(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **20.7%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
17.6	29.8	35.3	13.9	2.2

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

15.2%

Hungary



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

9,602,027

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

12,936

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

1.35

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.5

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

689,565

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

7.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

538,794

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

5.6

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

222

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1991
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2004
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1990
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2013
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1989

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

58.5%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
25.1	25.1	36.3	6.7	1.4

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

7.3%



Iceland



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



400,481

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



2,027

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



5.038



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.49

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

98,818

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



25.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

23,326

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

5.9


REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

16



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2020



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1976
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1998
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2012
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1955

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



CHRISTIAN
80%



MUSLIM
-



HINDU
-



JEWISH
-



BUDDHIST
-



OTHER
-



UNAFFILIATED
20%

LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

84%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
1.6	5.3	30.3	40.2	21.4


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

43.4%



Ireland



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

5,333,468

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

32,022

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

5.978

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.599

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,216,237

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

23.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

714,405

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

13.6

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

42


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2000
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2010
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1956

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Italy



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

59,041,927

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

58,272

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

0.989

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.219

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

6,553,671

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

11

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

2,941,444

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

5

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

2,146




YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1983
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2011
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1952

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

50.5%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
10.2	23.5	40	20.5	3.7

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

17%



Latvia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

1,843,068

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

-360

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

-0.196

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.354

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

220,471

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

11.8

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

161,014

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

8.6

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

26

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1997
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2007
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1995
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1997

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

37.6%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
7.5	23.4	53.7	7.4	1.4

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

8.3%



Liechtenstein



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026




NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1




IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2020**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1991
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1978
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2016
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Lithuania



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

2,808,883

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

-4,846

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

-1.733

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.223

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

175,194

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

6.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

459,268

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

16.1

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

15

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1997
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1993
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2012
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1997

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

26.2%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
5.4	18.2	50.2	17.7	1.5

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

3.5%



Luxembourg



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



684,039

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



4,938

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



7.183

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



1.411

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



344,309

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



51.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



61,859

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



9.2

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

77



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1998
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Malta



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026




NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1




IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1988
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2005
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1996
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1971

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Moldova



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

2,975,706

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

-16,732

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

-5.65

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.724

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

188,207

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

6.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

864,257

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

28.5

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

43

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	2002
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	2002

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Monaco



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2009**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2004
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	2004
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2016
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1954

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Montenegro



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

627,936

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026 **-2,824**



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026 (PER 1,000 POPULATION) **-4.51**



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN) **1.794**



REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **92,237**



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

14.4

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **90,678**



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

14.2

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING **16**



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2005
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	2003
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	2006

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION" (TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **45.9%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046) MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
5.3	7.8	57.9	17	8.4

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

4.7%



Netherlands



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

18,401,709

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

89,379

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

4.845

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

1.444

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

2,956,518

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

16.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

631,391

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

3.5

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

814


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2004
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2010
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

71%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
6	20.4	50.7	14.1	1.7

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

38%



North Macedonia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



1,809,076

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



-5,731

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



-3.177



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.47

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

150,902

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



8.3

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

534,616

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

29.3

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

9



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1998
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1994

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



CHRISTIAN
46.2%



MUSLIM
38.5%



HINDU
-



JEWISH
-



BUDDHIST
-



OTHER
-



UNAFFILIATED
15.4%

LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

46.3%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
8	18.6	45.9	14	4.6

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

7.3%



Norway



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

5,642,601

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

12,047

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

2.131

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.418

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,012,404

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

18.2

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

120,891

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

2.2

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

86



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2001
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1989
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

82.3%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
1.4	9.4	39.9	39.5	8.9

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

55.3%



Poland



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

37,915,155

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

-7,971

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION) **-0.211**

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.312 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,739,901

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

4.5

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

4,572,613


EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

11.9

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

277

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1991
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2005
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1991
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1991

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

40.1%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
8.1	16.3	45.9	21.6	3.5

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

15.9%



Portugal



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026




NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1982
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1976
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1960

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

56.4%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
1.6	11.7	36.9	42.3	4.6

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

21.6%



Romania



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



18,854,963

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



-28,982

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



-1.542



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.707

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

655,579

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



3.4

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

4,583,819



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

24.1




REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

500



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1994
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1997
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1993
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2008
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1991

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



CHRISTIAN
89.7%



MUSLIM
4.4%



HINDU
-



JEWISH
-



BUDDHIST
-



OTHER
-



UNAFFILIATED
5.9%

LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

27%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
7.9	16.2	48.7	14.8	4.8

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

10.4%



Russia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

143,559,521

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



324,924

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

2.266

1.47

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



7,605,774

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



5.3

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



9,134,094

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

6.3

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

290




YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2020



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	-
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

36%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
7.5	19.4	52.5	12.1	2

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

11.3%



San Marino



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1




IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING



(INCOMPLETE DATA)

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2001
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1988
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2011
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	-

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS (INCOMPLETE DATA)



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)
(INCOMPLETE DATA)



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)


RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
-	-	-	-	-

(INCOMPLETE DATA)

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

(INCOMPLETE DATA)



Serbia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

6,663,980

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026 **-5,883**



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026 (PER 1,000 POPULATION) **-0.886**



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN) **1.505**
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **712,550**



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION **10.6**



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL **963,307**



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION **14.3**



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING **62**



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2005
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	2003
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	2001

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION" (TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **38.2%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)
MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
11.6	18.6	49.7	9	4.9

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS" (3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046) **9.5%**

Slovakia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

5,455,816

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

134

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

0.024

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.571 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

323,991

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

5.9

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

389,909

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

7.1

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

58

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	-
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	-
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1993

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
15.3	25.1	41.4	15	1.3

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

3.8%



Slovenia



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

2,115,975

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



2,609

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



1.234

1.58

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



315,122

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

14.9

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

78,808

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

3.7

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

5



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1997
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1997
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1993
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2010
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1992

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

35.8%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
3.4	11.8	58.7	20.5	3.3

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

15.7%



Spain



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

47,874,678

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

85,305

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

1.783

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.239

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

8,870,527

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

18.5

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

1,623,550

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

3.4

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

229


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1978
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2000
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1977
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1978

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

60.6%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
2.1	10.9	38.7	39.1	7.5

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

39.4%



Sweden



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

10,680,346

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

42,755

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

3.995

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.445

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

2,272,158

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

21.4

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

223,508

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

2.1

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

171


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1996
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2010
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

85.4%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
7.3	23.4	28.3	30.5	8.3

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

70.9%



Switzerland



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

8,988,922

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

34,096

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

3.785

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

1.447 REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

2,773,840

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

31.1

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

512,547

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

5.7

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING


37

YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2022**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1976
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1972
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2013
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"
(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046) **72.3%**



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
3.2	11.2	45.2	30.9	8.5

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

18.8%



Turkey



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026



NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)




TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.619

(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

343



YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	2004
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	1977
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1950
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2016
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

32.8%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
26.4	36	26.7	7	1.2

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

15.6%



Ukraine



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026

39,681,570

NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026

-6,229

NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026

(PER 1,000 POPULATION)

-0.158

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026

1.004 (LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)

REPLACEMENT = 2.1

IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

5,064,173

IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

13.4

EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL

9,769,216

EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION

25.8

REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING

66


YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA

2022



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1996
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	1999
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	2004
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	1995
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2011
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	2002

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

36.6%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
2.7	11	53.1	17.2	3.1

"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

10.9%



United Kingdom



TOTAL POPULATION, 2026



NET NUMBER OF MIGRANTS, 2026




NET MIGRATION RATE, 2026
(PER 1,000 POPULATION)



TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 2026
(LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN)
REPLACEMENT = 2.1



IMMIGRANTS (IN-MIGRANTS) TOTAL



IMMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



EMIGRANTS (OUT-MIGRANTS) TOTAL




EMIGRANTS AS % OF POPULATION



REGISTERED VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING WITH MOST RECENT YEAR OF REPORTING




YEAR OF MOST RECENT DATA **2021**



EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER	1961
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, REVISED	-
LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS	-
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	-
CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	2009
1951 UN REFUGEE CONVENTION	1951

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MIGRANTS



LOCAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

"TRUST: PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION"

(TRUST COMPLETELY+TRUST SOMEWHAT; N: 81046)

80.5%



"IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY %" (N: 81046)

MISSING TO 100%: NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW; OTHER MISSING; MULTIPLE ANSWERS MAIL (EVS)

RATHER BAD	QUITE BAD	NEITHER GOOD, NOR BAD	QUITE GOOD	VERY GOOD
2.9	8.5	34.9	36.1	16.9


"JOBS SCARCE: EMPLOYERS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO (NATION) PEOPLE THAN IMMIGRANTS"

(3-POINT SCALE; DISAGREE; N: 81046)

45.3%



EUROPEAN UNION-RELATED DATA SETS



Resettled unaccompanied minors by age, sex and citizenship - annual data (migr_asylumresu\$defaultview)


Source of data: Eurostat - Last updated date: 15/01/2025 11:00

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General disclaimer of the EC website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/legal-notice_en

eurostat

First-time asylum applicants in EU countries, 2008-2024


(absolute numbers)



2008-2013 sum of available data. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 100.
Data for 2024, estimation due to missing data for Portugal for December 2024.


eurostat

ANNUAL RECOGNITION RATES AT FIRST INSTANCE BY DECISION OUTCOME, 2015–2024.



Source: EUAA Early Warning and Preparedness System (EPPS) data as of 7 February 2025. [Click here for Data Tables \(EU+ Countries\)](#). [Click here for Data Tables \(Citizenship\)](#)

Asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data



Asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data [migr_asyp00tza]


Source of data: Eurostat - Last updated date: 20/06/2025 23:00

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First-time asylum applicants by age and sex, 2024

(number of applicants, non-EU citizens)




Portugal: data for 2024 estimated due to missing data for December 2024.

Source: Eurostat - [migr_asyappctza](#)

IRREGULAR BORDER CROSSINGS 2015-2024

ICMPD Annual Report 2024




Source: Frontex, detections of irregular border crossings statistics

Source: Eurostat, Frontex

Population structure by major age groups, EU, 2009-2100

(% of total population)




Note: 2024: provisional/estimated. 2030–2100: projections (EUROPOP2023).
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: demo_pjanind and proj_23np)

eurostat

Resettled Persons


Annual Data - 2024



Source: Eurostat (dataset code tps00195)

Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics © OpenStreetMap
Cartography: Eurostat – IMAGE, 02/2026

Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded)



Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded) [migr_ejpre\$defaultview/]


Source of data: Eurostat - Last updated date: 12/01/2026 23:00

Disclaimer This graph has been created automatically by ESTAT/EC software according to external user specifications for which ESTAT/EC is not responsible. Graphic included.

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Top 10 citizenships of unaccompanied minors who applied for asylum in the EU, 2024

(number of first-time applicants, % in total, non-EU citizens)




Poland: data not available.

Portugal: data for 2024 estimated due to missing data for December 2024.

Source: Eurostat - [migr_asyumacta](#)

Top 15 citizenships of first-time asylum applicants in the EU, 2014 - 2024

(number of applicants, non-EU citizens)




The ranking of top 15 citizenships is based on the results recorded in 2024.

Portugal: data for 2024 estimated due to missing data for December 2024.

Source: Eurostat - [migr_asyappctza](#)

Unaccompanied minor asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data



Unaccompanied minor asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data [migr_asyumactia\$defaultview]

Source of data: Eurostat - Last updated date: 07/05/2025 23:00

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THINKING THEOLOGICALLY ABOUT MIGRATION

Theology is often understood with regard to doctrines, which are collective authoritative statements about the nature of God and how God relates to humanity and creation. However, theology is much more than articulated doctrinal statements. Persons of faith engage in theology when they think about the nature of God and how God relates to this world. The phrase “faith seeking understanding,” which has become a maxim for the formation of theology, has been attributed to St Anselm. Faith communities and individuals seek to make sense of their world and God at any given time and place. The act of theologizing gives meaning and moral guidance in understanding. If migration is an aspect of the human experience and narrative, it goes without saying that people of faith will theologize about migration.



HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CENTRAL MOTIVES FOR CHURCHES' WORK ON ASYLUM AND MIGRATION

Heinrich Bedford-Strohm⁴⁶

You Don't Let Anyone Drown. Period!

Human dignity is at stake. It needs the advocacy of the churches. As Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox leaders, in our 2021 common preface to the ecumenical memorandum on migration,⁴⁷ *Migration menschenwürdig gestalten (Shaping Migration in a Humane Manner)*, we gave a sobering account of the present situation in Europe:

Imbalances between the countries of the global North and the global South have continued to increase over the last two decades despite some countervailing movements. The biggest part of all refugees live in developing countries. Only a comparatively small proportion reaches Europe. Nevertheless, the member states of the European Union are fiercely debating the admission of refugees. Time and again, massive human rights violations occur at Europe's borders and people seeking protection drown in the Mediterranean. Despite all the achievements of European unification, it is a sobering realisation: A common policy that breathes the spirit of humanity and solidarity is currently not in sight in Europe.⁴⁸

This analysis is unfortunately still true, even more so than in 2021. That is why the churches have tried to unite in Europe and beyond to remind us all of the basic values that have been at the cradle of Europe as a peace project. There may be no other sentence that stands so much for this involvement of the churches here as a sentence that was said in the sermon of the closing service of the Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag in Dortmund in June 2019: "You don't let anyone drown. Period!" This sentence, spoken by German pastor Dr Sandra Bilz, made history. It led to concrete action by the churches in a way that we had never experienced before.

Briefly before that, on 3 June 2019, after a visit of the crew of the search-and-rescue vessel *Sea-Watch 3* in Sicily, which was blocked by the Italian authorities, and together with then-Mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando, we published the Palermo Appeal. It was subsequently supported by many people, including many prominent people. In it, we called for an end to the criminalization of civil search-and-rescue missions in the Mediterranean

along with the resumption of such missions as a task of the European states and a distribution mechanism for rescued boat refugees.

Following a resolution by a big crowd during the Kirchentag, and based on the support of the EKD Council as the governing body of the German Protestant churches, we presented the United4Rescue alliance to the public in Hamburg at the beginning of December. About 950 institutions and organizations now belong to the alliance.

The appeal for donations was so well received that the money needed to buy the former research vessel *Poseidon* was raised within two months. Following the ship's christening under the name *Sea-Watch 4* and the delayed refit due to the pandemic, the ship was finally able to leave for the Mediterranean in August 2020. The ship rescued 353 people on its first mission. Meanwhile, our alliance supports four search-and-rescue vessels, which have saved thousands of people from drowning—and continue to do so.

Saving human lives always takes priority.

More than 20,000 people have drowned while fleeing across the Mediterranean. The number of unreported cases is probably much higher. Despite this, Europe is allowing ships that are supposed to save people from drowning to be blocked or obstructed, while at the same time, European states are refusing to resume sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean. This is a moral scandal.

From the point of view of basic Christian principles, it is not decisive why people are in mortal danger. It is only clear that their lives *are* in danger. And then you simply have to save them. All political discussions about managing migration and dealing with asylum seekers can and must be held, but not instead of saving human lives. Saving human lives always takes priority. This is why the European states in particular, which explicitly refer to Christianity, have a duty to take seriously the basic ethical orientations associated with Christianity and to develop a refugee policy with all European states that is not characterized by isolation but by humanity.

Deliberately letting people die at the borders of Europe is in strong tension to the moral basis of the Christian heritage.

If we take a closer look at the biblical tradition as the basis of our Christian faith, it becomes clear why the present European policies toward refugees—for which I have only given the most drastic example of deliberately letting people die at the borders of Europe—is in strong tension to the moral basis of the Christian heritage, which so many politicians keep claiming as the basis of the European peace project.

The Basic Orientation of Biblical Ethics

God's image and likeness

Theological discourse about migration and asylum is first of all based on the impulse from the biblical story of creation that every human being is created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27) and therefore is of infinite value, and that this infinite value cannot be taken away from us by anyone. The first article of the German constitution (“Grundgesetz”) stands for it: “Human dignity shall be inviolable.”

We are so used to the idea of humanity being created in God's image and likeness being a basic element of our cultural thought that we sometimes forget how unexpected but also how precious that claim is. In Psalm 8 we read: “Yet you have made them [human beings] a little lower than God.” This strong attribution of kingly characterizations to every human being found within the Jewish tradition⁴⁹ leads to the idea in Christianity that God has come into the world as a human being, Jesus Christ. We cannot more strongly base the humanitarian legacy to which we are indebted than on the conviction that we encounter God in a human being: more explicitly, in one who was crucified, in one who was a victim of political and religious persecution, whose execution was slow and painful.⁵⁰

Based on this, there is no relationship with God without a relationship with my neighbour. The question is not *whether* a church, informed by this tradition, takes part in public discussions about dealing with human need, but rather *how* it responds to this need. What, then, can we learn from the Bible as the decisive source of Judeo-Christian tradition about how to deal with refugees and asylum?

“For you were also strangers...”

The fundamental characteristic of a biblically based Christian ethic is—and this is remarkable, considering our topic—that it is an ethic stemming from a migration movement. Within exegetics, the so-called Creed of Israel is regarded as Israel's initial confession of faith. For this reason, it can also be seen as something like the starting point of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Deuteronomy 26:5b-9 states:

A wandering Aramean was my ancestor; he went down into Egypt and lived there as an alien [a stranger], few in number, and there he became a great nation, mighty and populous. When the Egyptians treated us harshly and afflicted us, by imposing hard labour on us, we cried to the Lord, the God of our ancestors; the Lord heard our voice and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression. The Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with a terrifying display of power, and with signs and wonders; and he brought us into this place and gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey.

We Christians, together with Jews, believe that God is one who led his people out of oppression and slavery in Egypt into freedom. In light of the insoluble connection between the relationship to God and the relationship to our neighbour, it becomes clear why the commandment to protect the stranger has nothing to do with moralizing. The commandment to protect the stranger has its validity by being firmly rooted in the history of God's liberating action for God's people.

When an alien [stranger] resides with you in your land, you shall not oppress the alien [stranger]. The alien [stranger] who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God. (Lev. 19:33-34; see also Deut. 10:19ff; Exod. 22:20).

This statement can be seen as *the* classical expression of the rootedness of love in the relationship between God and humanity. For it does not just say, “Love the stranger!” Instead, the commandment is a twofold plea. First, there is an appeal to reason based on experience: “You know what it is like to be a stranger and shunned. Treat the stranger the way you would like to be treated if you were in the same situation.” The second way the commandment is endorsed is by referring to God himself: at the end, God says, “I am the Lord your God. Whatever concerns

the stranger concerns me, just as your concerns are my concerns. I am your God, I care for the stranger. So shall you care for the stranger!”

The basis for this openness to the stranger is an *ethic of empathy*. This can be seen best in a passage in Exodus: “You shall not oppress a resident alien; you know the heart of an alien, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt” (Exod. 23:9).

By understanding and empathizing with the vulnerable situation strangers are in, it becomes plausible to treat them with honour and respect.

With the constitutive character of empathy, we encounter a special characteristic of Judeo-Christian ethics that is most visible when looking at how one should treat strangers but is valid for the entire ethical system. It really comes into focus when we look at the New Testament and a specific aspect of the commandment to love, namely its close connection to the so-called Golden Rule.⁵¹

The double commandment of love and the Golden Rule

When Jesus is asked which commandment is the greatest, he responds:

“‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ This is the greatest and first commandment. And a second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself.’ On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.” (Matt. 22:37-40)

Here we see that Matthew emphasizes the special importance of this twofold commandment to love by calling it “the law and the prophets” (Matt. 22:40), a phrase that underlines the fundamental character of this commandment. Only one other New Testament tradition is honoured with the title of being “the law and the prophets” and thus containing the entire content of the ethics of Jesus: the Golden Rule: “In everything do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets” (Matt. 7:12).

Caring for the stranger in the Bible can never be separated from the relationship with God.

The Golden Rule is a key phrase for understanding moral life as the ability and necessity to empathize with

others. The commandment to care for the stranger grounds such empathy in the experience of the people of God being led themselves out of oppression in Egypt into the promised land.

Empathy based on their own experience was characteristic of the reaction to the arriving refugees in 2015 by many elderly Germans who had also been displaced persons in their early lives. The relatively strong readiness on the part of the older generation in Germany to take in these refugees has to do with the memories of their own experience of forced displacement out of the former German areas in Eastern Europe in 1945. Thus, current experience underscores the sustainability of a biblical ethics of empathy as the basic approach for dealing with refugees and migrants today.

We have seen that caring for the stranger in the Bible can never be separated from the relationship with God. Its most pointed formulation can be found in the parable of the day of judgment, in which dealing with the stranger is the touchstone for dealing with Christ: “I was a stranger,” Christ says “and you welcomed me...” (Matt. 25:35). Thus, taking in the stranger, who is especially vulnerable, is prominently regarded as one of the works of mercy, which we do to Christ himself.

The saviour of the world shares the same destiny as the lowest of the low. He was a refugee.

It is also remarkable that the Christmas story is a story about fleeing and asylum. According to Matthew 2:13-15, the parents of the newborn Jesus, who are on the run from King Herod, are not turned away at the Egyptian border but are allowed to stay. The saviour of the world shares the same destiny as the lowest of the low. He was a refugee. This story plays an important role in the Coptic-Orthodox Church of Egypt, and many legends surround it. The Coptic Christians, especially Pope Tawadros II, continuously remind us that Egypt is also Holy Land. Numerous places are venerated as places where the mother of Jesus rested with her divine child. This tradition found its place in the art world, namely in icons. Thus, these visible signs show us how, to this day, this refugee baby has become an integral part of Christian history and a sign of divine blessing.

The way in which the commandment to love can be the basis for an ethic of empathy when encountering migrants and refugees is also determined by the question of how universally the commandment of love should be understood. There are, however, ethical approaches, which follow the popular opinion that we should first take

care of those in need in our country. These show a deep scepticism for the universality of the commandment to love.

Those Near and Those Far. The Extent of the Commandment of Love

The American theologian Stephen Post argues for a concept of loving thy neighbour that puts special relations in focus. Special relations are those relationships with family and friends, those people who are close, who share an especially intense kind of love. This orientation toward special relations is combined with a strong criticism of concepts of love, such as the classical work written by the American ethicist Gene Outka on *agape*,⁵² which are oriented toward the universalism of enlightenment and find powerful expression in the human rights tradition.

If it is true, says Stephen Post, that the natural order of life has theological and moral dignity if God regulates the world through “special relations” between individuals, then these cannot be judged morally the same way impersonally distant relationships are, which are simply based on “equal regard.”⁵³ Of course, we have duties toward strangers, says Post, and *exclusive* concentration on family and friends is problematic. That does not mean, however, that there is no moral priority to this concentration.⁵⁴

This position’s charm lies in its proximity to intuitively logical daily experience. Naturally, we feel a more direct moral responsibility toward those children who are entrusted to us than to those children in need in other parts of the world. Paying less attention to our own children than to those children in the world who are less fortunate would rightly evoke moral criticism.

Still, it is no accident that in the New Testament, the commandment to love is explained with stories in which the act of love goes beyond special relations. This is the case both for the rich young man and the command to give his money to the poor (Matt. 19:16-26) and for the Good Samaritan who, as a foreigner, rescues the injured Jew (Luke 10:25-37).⁵⁵

The intuitive plausibility of being responsible for those individuals in our social proximity on the one hand and the universalism of the commandment to love on the other hand are not in conflict with each other if we understand universalism as “concrete universalism” and weave it into an ethic of empathy.

Concrete and close personal relationships in our social proximity and the universal concern for human wellbeing, the core of this idea, depend on each other. Taking action for those “far away,” for people with whom we neither have a personal connection nor share a common religious

or ideological orientation, becomes an abstract surrogate for love if it is not continually fed from the experience of giving and receiving love in our own personal realm. Being moved to give love to those far away is nurtured by our direct social relationships, which teach us and show us concretely and visibly what people suffer from and what they hope for.

From the perspective of concrete universalism, a life of gratitude in the density and intimacy of “special relations” is not in competition with a life focused on universal love but rather supports it. The ability to love those who are far away from us touches once again upon empathy. A father who loves his children and cares for them, who practises love in “special relations,” cannot help but open his love universally. Because he experiences the density of human relationships in his direct social proximity, he will be able to love those strangers who live far away from him more than simply abstractly. He will be able to put himself in the shoes of the father who is seeking asylum, who cannot offer his children the safe space he would want to give them, but instead lives every day in fear of being deported. Giving and receiving love in “special relations” enables one to give love beyond those relations.

A position that sees Christian love only in relationships of close proximity underestimates the universal potential of loving empathy. Through empathy, which is the goal aimed at by the commandment to love, the neighbour who is distant becomes the one who is close.

If we now have a firm ethical ground on an empathy-based approach toward refugees, what does it mean for politics? It seems clear that stating the importance of empathy is not enough for political decisions, which sometimes are characterized by dilemma situations and demand hard decisions.

In ethics, this question has frequently been debated with a pair of terms originally coming from Max Weber’s *Politics as Vocation*: “ethics of conviction” (*Gesinnungsethik*) and “ethics of responsibility” (*Verantwortungsethik*). In the debate on refugees, some politicians have used this pair as a weapon against the churches’ position, suggesting that they were taking a position of blue-eyed *Gesinnungsethik* while politicians had to act responsibly.

An “Ethics of Conviction” Based on Responsibility

We clearly have to reject this interpretation. The churches call out for political decisions which go beyond moral correctness and attempt to really change the situation. Of course, a social ethics which comes with a maybe inspiring prophetic attitude but only functions in theory is a poor one because it is without effect. A division of duties, which



allows the churches to voice humanitarian ideals and leaves policymakers alone in trying to find morally justifiable political solutions, would not be the right way.⁵⁶

Dividing the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility between church and politics does not do justice to the complexity of the motives on both sides. In addition, it would be a distortion of the intentions with which this pair of terms was originally introduced. It is actually the connection in the distinction between conviction and responsibility, which Max Weber specifically demonstrated when he introduced this pair of terms in *Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf)* around one hundred years ago.⁵⁷

For Weber, people who act based on an ethics of conviction do not take into account the results of their conduct or are not ready to take responsibility for the results. People who act based on an ethics of responsibility, on the other hand, consider the possible results and then decide upon their actions accordingly. However, what Weber finds crucial is for all responsible actions to be led and informed by conviction. It is, Weber says,

immensely moving when a mature man – no matter whether old or young in years – is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: ‘Here I stand; I can do no other.’ That is something genuinely human and moving. And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realize the possibility of finding himself at some time in that position. In so far as this is true, an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man – a man who can have the ‘calling for politics.’⁵⁸

We have to stop pitting humanitarianism and realism against each other. It does not aid the public discussion to have one political position claim to have an approach of realism while suspecting all other diverging opinions as being naive. Truly being realistic, from a Christian point of view, cannot be understood without viewing Christ as being the reality that grounds our reality. Dietrich Bonhoeffer illustrates this position impressively in his ethics by emphasizing God’s reconciliation of the whole world in Christ.⁵⁹ Realism can therefore not ignore what Bonhoeffer calls the “view from below.” With respect to refugees, this means that realism must always be able to give a satisfying answer to the question of what the realistic option means for the weakest individuals in the situation.

With respect to refugees, this means that realism must always be able to give a satisfying answer to the question of what the realistic option means for the weakest individuals in the situation.

Let us return to the words of Max Weber:

[A]ll ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ [‘ethic of conviction’] or to an ‘ethic of responsibility.’ ... In so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends [ethic of conviction] and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man – a man who can have the ‘calling for politics.’⁶⁰

Public Witness of the Churches

After the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted in May 2024, the churches have publicly criticized its possibly detrimental impact on refugees seeking a life in dignity.

The introduction of mandatory border procedures harbours the risk of once again producing unsustainable conditions, which had been experienced earlier in camps like Moria. Those who do not benefit from a regular asylum procedure will remain in detention-like camps until their status can be clarified and they can be returned to a country willing to accept them. Experience shows that there is often no country willing to accept them. It is therefore to be feared that conditions will once again arise in which men, women, and children are now being detained in inhumane conditions at the border of the EU

after terrible experiences as refugees. This flies in the face of European values. It is to be feared that Europe, which for many people embodies the dream of freedom, will become a nightmare.

Dealing with migration in accordance with our principles looks different. Legal access routes must be strengthened, and the options for switching between immigration and asylum law must be expanded. We are currently seeing long-term care homes having to close and restaurants only being open a few days a week because there is simply no labour force to be found. It is therefore clear that we need immigration, if only for our own sake. Taking in refugees does not have to be a problem if people are allowed to move to places where they have family ties, where they can find accommodation, and if they are given quick access to the labour market.

In many places, however, there is a shortage of housing, nursery, and school places. That is why we need a joint social effort to overcome these challenges and create the necessary social infrastructure. If people who come here are allowed to work, then they can contribute to this great endeavour themselves instead of being a burden on others. They do not want to be a burden on anyone. They want to contribute. You just have to let them. This is the fundamental direction in which the public statements of the EKD and beyond have taken a stand in the public debate. I will give two examples.

In 2017, the EKD published a paper on the refugee question, which promotes ten convictions. You will recognize many of the insights, which I have tried to explain:

1. God's love is for the whole world and does not stop at national borders.
2. God created all people in his image and has thereby given each and everyone inviolable dignity.
3. To love one's neighbour is an obligation. It must show in readily receiving refugees.
4. The desire for security must be carefully balanced against the rights to freedom and tolerance, which are the very foundations of an open society.
5. Faith in God means that justice and peace are the guiding principles for our responsibility towards the world. Christians are opening their eyes to the injustices and their role in combating such inequalities.
6. Fending off victims of violence and terror at our borders, or allowing them to drown, flies in the face of the European Peace Project and damages the soul of Europe.

7. Religious freedom is for everyone. Tolerance ends where religion and religious freedom are abused in order to insult people and their dignity. We stand at the side of all the oppressed and persecuted Christians across the globe.
8. Families must be protected. Whoever is granted asylum in Germany has the right to family reunification with their spouse or life partner and younger children.
9. Social cohesion requires the courage to remain well-meaning, rather than succumbing to feelings of fear and defeat towards those who have found refuge in Germany.
10. Democracy thrives upon debate. Currently, however, racism and xenophobia are highly polarising the political and social debate. A civil exchange of opinions can break up hardened frontlines in an argument – and thus strengthen social cohesion for the benefit of all.⁶¹

The ecumenical memorandum in migration, *Migration menschenwürdig gestalten*, from 2021 gives concrete orientations for church and society. It underlines the necessity of pastoral support for migrants, including if they set out on the path to baptism. It appeals to society to understand migration as normality, to enable integration, to counter racism, and to protect religious freedom. It promotes interreligious dialogue. It demands that the state protect families, support those in particular need of protection, combat exploitation and human trafficking, help people without residence papers to gain their rights, provide responsible support for returns, avert humanitarian hardship, and encourage the churches to advocate a European refugee policy based on human rights, to save human lives through search-and-rescue missions, and to assume international responsibility.


Conclusion

I will end with a theological thought. “For you also were strangers...” The reminder that we ourselves are also dependent on receiving help in times of need is particularly important when we are preoccupied with ourselves. Biblical ethics is characterized by the grateful reminder of the blessing we have experienced through God’s actions, both personally and as a land that was at rock bottom and is now, despite all the high, excessive inequality in distribution, one of the lands on earth that is most blessed with prosperity. This memory alone would be an occasion to share this blessing with others. And then to experience that it becomes greater when it is shared.

Solidarity with the most vulnerable is perhaps the most important attitude for getting through challenging times. This solidarity naturally applies to our neighbours

in a geographical sense. But in the light of biblical tradition, it also applies to those who are geographically distant but who are just as much our neighbours in the biblical sense.

Every human being is created in the image of God. This statement from Genesis is one of the fundamental statements of the Jewish-Christian tradition. It does not say: every European, every white person, every man, or every adult. It says: every human being. And that is why the horizon of our responsibility does not end at the European borders. In light of the biblical option for the poor, we say: “The prosperity of a society is measured by the fate of its weakest members. This applies to our own country. It applies to Europe. And it applies to the world as a whole.”



NOT THE FINAL WORD, BUT THE LIVING WORD: ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND MIGRATION

Ryszard Bobrowicz

Every pair of footsteps that crosses a border testifies to much more than a physical journey. It is a testament of hopes and dreams, of fears and longings, of faith that the effort of moving might bring about a better future. Whenever people cross borders, their faith crosses with them and encounters the faiths of those residing on the other side. Theology and migration are then inexplicably tied together. The interplay between the two, however, takes many different shapes on the ground.

Over the last decade, we have witnessed a strong presence of the theology of clashing civilizations in Europe, which could be construed as a “theology contra migration” approach. In the spirit of an embattled stronghold, some kinds of theology were used as divisive identity markers, drawing a strict line between the people on the move and the receiving communities. If you are reading this book, you might be tempted to discard such views as a hijacking of faith by those who do not understand it. But it is important to acknowledge that such responses are part of Christian traditions: for centuries, Christianity was used to divide as often as it was a source of unity. Instead of opposing such views by presenting another vision of “true theology,” we need to deny any human ability to identify one true theology and instead acknowledge the ongoing presence of the Holy Spirit in our lives.⁶² Theology should be viewed as an open-ended project, a dynamic process of continuous engagement, encounter, and exchange. In other words, theology should not be the final word—it should be the living word.

As a result, three different approaches might be helpful in thinking about the relationship between migration and theology. First, “theology of migration” refers to a theology engaged from the position of self-efficacy. Theological traditions offer resources for individuals to assume social roles and respond to specific situations. In this way, the approach of a theology of migration concerns how people use their faith as a resource in their capacity as migrants and hosts. Theology of migration often navigates the social work of faith-based organizations that heed the call of their faith to welcome their neighbours. It is captured well in the quote from Mark Hetfield, the president of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society: “We used to take refugees because they were Jewish. Now we take them because we’re Jewish.”⁶³

The two other approaches reconstitute our understanding of theology. “Migration of theology” imposes on us the notion that theology is constantly transformed by the experience of being on the move and the encounter between different theological viewpoints. “Migration theology” goes even deeper, arguing that migration and theology are co-constitutive, and one cannot be done without the other. As theologian Peter C. Phan argues, in the “Age of Migration,” we should remember that all theology is contextual, and “migrantness” is a mark of the church and Christianity. Migration theology is a theology thought through from the perspective of migration—conceptualizing, among others, God as a primordial migrant and Christians as pilgrims.⁶⁴

In the end, as theologians and as Christians, the “Age of Migration” requires us to go beyond the comfort of our own identity, which does not mean losing it. A theological sense of identity should provide us with self-efficacy to chart the unsettled, unfinished project of theology immersed in migration, not only reaching out to people on the move but reconsidering ourselves as on the move, too. Only then will we be able to truly engage in mutually transformative encounters that can provide space for true accompaniment of each other.





CHRISTIAN UNITY

Fellowship (*koinonia*) lies at the heart of the Christian understanding of the church (*ecclesiology*), shaping how believers gather for worship and are sent out in mission. Migration creates contexts marked by theological, cultural, and confessional diversity. The ecumenical movement has offered both theological insights and practical structures that make shared Christian life possible across these differences. These frameworks do not dissolve disagreement, but they sustain communion by orienting Christians toward what they hold in common in Christ. The following section presents concrete examples of how such fellowship is practised, illustrating how Christians encounter one another as fellow believers and discover unity through shared life in Christ.



READING ECCLESIAL TRANSFORMATION THROUGH MIGRATION AND CONGREGATIONAL COMPOSITION

Alessia Passarelli

Migration has reshaped the social, cultural, and religious landscape of Europe. Churches—whether centuries-old institutions or newer communities—are experiencing significant transformation as members from different countries, languages, and traditions become part of their congregations. To understand these changes, two analytical approaches have proven particularly useful: how churches understand their position in the national religious context, and how churches describe their internal composition and the cultural background of their members.

These categories are not rigid or exhaustive. Rather, they are tools that help us read and interpret how churches evolve in contexts marked by mobility, diversity, and shifting identities.⁶⁵

Position of the Church in the National Context

In the third edition of *Mapping Migration*, churches were asked to define their own position within the wider national Christian context, emphasizing self-perception, historical rootedness, and degree of establishment. The very meaning of being a “majority” or “minority” church is itself the subject of ongoing scholarly debate as demographic shifts, secularization, and new forms of mobility continuously reshape these categories.⁶⁶

Some churches have existed for centuries and represent the majority of Christians in a country. Others are equally historic but remain minorities. Alongside them, we find churches that have become established only in recent decades and churches that are very new—often founded by migrant groups seeking spaces of worship, support, and community.

Distinguishing among these positions helps us understand the resources, challenges, and public visibility each type of church might have in a changing society.

Composition of the Church: Who Are Its Members?

Understanding how churches change also requires attention to the cultural, ethnic, and genealogical composition of their members. Labels such as “migrant church” or “migrant-led church” are increasingly inadequate. They risk freezing people in a permanent state of migration, even when they are citizens or when the community has existed for decades. Moreover, many congregations include people with mixed backgrounds, multiple citizenships, or second- or third-generation members who do not identify with the migrant label at all.

TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF CHURCH POSITIONS

Category	Description	Key Features	Examples (Europe)
A. Long-established majority church	Historic presence; majority among Christians	Centuries old; institutional continuity	Catholic Church (Italy, Austria, France); Evangelical Church (parts of Germany); Orthodox Church(es) (Greece, Romania)
B. Long-established minority church	Historic but numerically small	Deep roots; minority identity	Waldensian Church (Italy); Orthodox Church (Finland); Evangelical churches (Spain); Black and migrant churches (UK)
C. Established minority church (30+ years presence)	Not historic, but stable and recognized	Minority; multi-decade presence	Many Pentecostal/Evangelical churches; some Orthodox churches in Western Europe
D. Newly established church (<30 years)	Recent formation, often migrant founded	Emerging identity; flexible structures	New migrant churches across Europe

Introducing genealogical and multi-ethnic dimensions allows us to capture the diversity within diversity: not only where people come from, but also how long they have been rooted in their current context and how their identities evolve across generations.

Why These Categories Matter

These analytical tools help us understand several key dynamics:

- Transformation of identity: Churches renegotiate who they are when new members arrive with different histories and expectations.
- Leadership and participation: Increasing diversity requires rethinking decision-making and inclusion.
- Belonging and memory: Some communities

may struggle to maintain traditions, while others rediscover old practices or create new ones.

- Beyond labels: Terms like “national” or “migrant” are increasingly inadequate in societies where many people hold multiple identities simultaneously.

Ultimately, churches are not static institutions. They are living communities shaped by movement, encounter, and cultural creativity. As Europe becomes more diverse, churches too are redefining their boundaries, their mission, and their sense of belonging.

TABLE 2. EXAMPLES OF COMPOSITION TYPES

Category	Description	(Possible) Characteristics
1. Mainly “indigenous” churchgoers	Majority of members have no migrant background	Long historical continuity; stable membership
2. Indigenous churches with a stable minority of migrant-background members	Diversity present but not dominant	Mixed leadership; occasional multilingual practices
3. Churches composed mainly of people from one shared region of origin	Members share a geographical or cultural background	Strong communal identity; culturally specific worship
4. Churches composed mainly of people from multiple world regions	Highly diverse membership	Multilingual worship; intercultural negotiations
5. Second- or third-generation migrant-background churchgoers	Members whose parents or grandparents migrated	Hybrid identifications; less attachment to “migrant” labels
6. Multi-ethnic / intercultural churches (including indigenous churchgoers)	Diversity of backgrounds reflected in worship, structure, leadership	Intentional intercultural practices; shared governance

“BEING CHURCH TOGETHER”: THE ITALIAN PROTESTANT JOURNEY TOWARD INTEGRATION

Alessia Passarelli

When Italy shifted, in the early 1990s, from being a country of emigrants to one that welcomed immigrants, Protestant churches found themselves at a crossroads. The pews began to fill with new faces—men and women from Ghana, Nigeria, the Philippines, Latin America—who came not as visitors but as fellow believers seeking a spiritual home. For the small but historically significant Italian Protestant minority, this was not just a demographic change; it was a theological turning point.

How could churches that had long been defined by their own minority status now become spaces of welcome and belonging for others—people whose languages, worship styles, and experiences of faith were profoundly different?

The answer took shape in a daring experiment called *Essere Chiesa Insieme*—literally, Being Church Together. Conceived within the Federation of Evangelical Churches in Italy (FCEI), it was neither a programme nor a slogan but a vision: to live out a form of church life that rejected both forced assimilation and ethnic separation. Instead of creating “Italian” and “foreign” congregations, the goal was to build something new—an intercultural community where diversity would not be managed but celebrated and where belonging would not erase difference.

The Beginnings: A Laboratory of Encounters

The idea was born in the early 1990s, in the wake of a 1990 conference on pastoral care for migrants. By 1997, *Essere Chiesa Insieme* (ECI) was officially described as “a meeting place, a laboratory for verifying and developing experiences of church life in the presence of migrants.”

One of the earliest and most vibrant laboratories was in Palermo. What began with five African immigrants in 1991 soon became a small revolution in worship. Services blended languages, rhythms, and gestures—what the pastor called three forms of “contamination”: liturgical (bilingual hymns and African drums beside the organ); theological (shared preaching between Italian and African pastors); and spiritual (diverse expressions of prayer, from silence to dance).

One of the first Ghanaian members later remembered: “In the mid-90s there were about 50 of us from Africa in the Palermo church ... and we were *church together!* The pastor even sent some of us to northern Italy to help other communities welcome the new wave of evangelical migrants.”

It was a fragile but hopeful beginning—a vision carried northward, parish by parish.

Two Paths Toward the Same Horizon

Over time, two distinct models took shape.

The Waldensian-Methodist churches, heirs to Italy’s oldest Protestant tradition, opted for full integration. There would be no “ethnic” congregations, only one shared church. In Mezzano, “brothers and sisters from Africa are fully integrated into the community,” the minister says. Yet, as the years went on, enthusiasm met the test of reality. By 2007, the church newspaper, *Riforma*, captured the mood with a telling metaphor: “We have moved from poetry to prose. But the choice of a mixed-race church has been made. There is no turning back.”

The Baptist churches, on the other hand, chose a more pragmatic route. They welcomed ethnic congregations into their Union through formal agreements, giving them access to the benefits of the Italian *intesa* (state concordat). As one Baptist minister explained, “Our conviction was that the concordat should not be a privilege ... but the start of a new phase where it could become a prerogative for all denominations.”

Different paths, yet animated by the same question: How can we be one church when our stories, languages, and expectations are so different?

Seeds of Innovation

Despite the difficulties, Essere Chiesa Insieme left a lasting mark. It pushed Italian Protestants to rethink what “church” means in an age of migration.

- Theological innovation: ECI moved beyond charity or aid to migrants, developing an intercultural ecclesiology that treated newcomers not as recipients but as co-builders.
- Formation and training: Programmes like LINFA (Laboratorio Interculturale di Formazione e Accoglienza) translated ideals into practice, offering pastors and laypeople tools for real inclusion.
- European resonance: The Italian experience inspired similar initiatives abroad, positioning the FCEI as a reference point for intercultural church work in Europe.
- Enduring commitment: More than 30 years later, the vision continues to evolve, adapting to new generations and new challenges.

The Shadows Beside the Light

Yet, the story was never one of uninterrupted success. Like all experiments in the community, Essere Chiesa Insieme had its moments of friction and fatigue.

Cultural and theological tensions sometimes ran deep. Differences in worship styles, gender roles, and views on sexuality exposed fragile points of coexistence. The 2010 controversy over same-sex blessings, when some Ghanaian members threatened to leave the Waldensian-Methodist Church, revealed just how complex “being church together” could be.

Leadership challenges also emerged. African pastors and lay leaders—often called “reverse missionaries”—played vital roles, yet their double belonging sometimes made integration harder rather than easier.

Participation gaps persisted, too. A Baptist report in 2010 noted that “many Italian churches show little interest in mutual integration ... Italian and ethnic pastors rarely meet.”

And economic instability—especially after 2008—hit migrant members hard, fragmenting communities as people moved in search of work.

Growing Generations

Among the most striking developments over time has been the role of younger generations. For many first-generation immigrants, the church was not only a place of faith but also a refuge, a home—a space where one could speak a known language, hear familiar songs, and reproduce cultural patterns from home. This need for recognition often made integration slower, as parents sought comfort in what felt stable and known.

But their children, born or raised in Italy, inhabit a different world. They move with ease between languages and cultures, and their sense of belonging is more relational than geographical. For them, “being church together” is not a project but a condition of life. When given opportunities to meet, work, and worship alongside peers of diverse backgrounds, young people often bridge divisions that adults struggle to overcome.

Many of the most promising signs of intercultural church life today—joint youth camps, musical worship projects, volunteer service networks—have emerged precisely where second generations have been empowered to lead.

Convergence and Continuity

Over time, the two main models began to converge. Waldensian-Methodist communities that once resisted ethnic churches began to include them as part of the church, with the condition of keeping strong ties with other churches in the district and in the circuit. Baptist congregations that had initially favoured autonomy started seeking stronger mechanisms of integration. Slowly, the lines blurred—not through ideology, but through lived experience.

Today, Essere Chiesa Insieme is less a programme than a way of being—a fragile, persistent effort to live interculturality as a daily practice.

Lessons from a Long Journey

From this 30-year journey, several lessons emerge:

- Integration is a process, not a point of arrival. It must be renegotiated continually as people, contexts, and generations change.
- Real inclusion demands structure, not just goodwill. Without shared leadership and intentional formation, diversity remains decorative.

- Mutual transformation is essential. Integration succeeds only when both hosts and newcomers change in the process.
- Enthusiasm must be renewed through difficult times. The shift from “poetry to prose” is not failure, but maturation.
- Negotiating the religious habitus is crucial. Building intercultural churches requires ongoing dialogue about worship styles, authority, gender roles, and the meaning of faith in daily life. Integration does not erase differences of religious habitus—it invites their negotiation, where mutual learning becomes a form of discipleship.
- Flexibility is key. Rigid models cannot contain the fluid reality of intercultural life.

In the end, Essere Chiesa Insieme remains neither a triumph nor a failure but a living testimony to what it means to try—to stay at the table, to sing in more than one language, to keep learning what it means to be *church together*. Its endurance may be its greatest success: proof that genuine multicultural community is built not in grand declarations but in the patient, everyday work of grace.



A Roma church in Germany



SERBIAN ROMA ECONOMIC AND TRANSNATIONAL MIGRANTS IN GERMANY

Melody J. Wachsmuth

There is an unknown but significant number of Roma economic migrants and Roma migrant churches in Western Europe; some of the migrants arrived because of employment, and some as asylum seekers, citing discrimination and racism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).⁶⁷ There is a transnational migration element evident as many stay invested in families, communities, and real estate back in their home country while also building lives in their host country. Sometimes families do not have proper documents, and these individuals are quite vulnerable to being exploited and to labour trafficking. Roma migrant churches often focus on their own particular group of Roma, since they may speak different dialects and have different cultural practices. However, there are also churches that include a variety of Roma groups. Sometimes, enough people from a single community or congregation arrive in a specific location, and a pastor from the home country will appoint an elder or pastor to lead the church. In addition, some Roma pastors in CEE often travel to the West to evangelize among their language-speaking group in a given country.

This case study highlights Roma economic migrants from Serbia to Germany who have now planted churches in Berlin, Lübeck, Hamburg, and Solingen. The current pastors or elders did not come with a missional or ministry intent but rather to seek jobs, asylum, and/or a better life. However, they attest that God shifted their focus through various circumstances, and they began to actively reach out to their Roma groups and eventually began churches. In the church in Berlin, a father and son began serving jointly with an already established Sinti church. However, after differences in ministry philosophy, they left that church, and shortly after, a Roma pastor from Bulgaria offered them the lease on his church as he was moving to a different city. In the beginning, there were both Serbian and Bulgarian Roma, and the pastor's son learned Bulgarian to translate the service. Currently, there are about 30 Serbian Roma families, or around 120 people, coming to church, with only 10 remaining from Bulgaria; however, there are around 150 Roma families from Serbia living in Berlin. About 30 percent have lived for a long time in Germany for a long time, whereas the rest have only been there 2 or 3 years. The leaders say the biggest challenge is the language and finding places to stay; finding work is not difficult.

The pastor who leads a church in Hamburg and Lübeck arrived in Germany in 2014, and it took him about 6 years to hear God's call to reach out to his people. There were several men whose lives were self-destructing through drugs and alcohol, and he began to seriously pursue and meet with them. Eventually, more people began converting and meeting together, and his home church in Leskovac, Serbia, appointed him as pastor of the Lübeck church he planted. One hundred and ten people have been baptized, with 60 attending regularly. In 2024, he opened the Hamburg church. Although there are fifty families in Lübeck, there are around 300 in Hamburg and more in the surrounding towns—thus, the pastor has a big vision for evangelism and more church planting. When he heard of the Roma Bible School, which began in 2022 in Southeastern Europe, he asked the board if it was possible to also run a school in Germany. Thus, the German school began in 2024, involving 27 students from various cities. Among the students are those men who were lost in drugs and alcohol just a few years before.

Both leaders note that, in general, life is much easier for them in Germany as opposed to Serbia, as there is less discrimination and the laws for human rights are enforced. They have very little contact with German churches or pastors. They have some contact with Roma churches from Romania or Bulgaria, but do not work with them. They have great vision to continue reaching their people in the various German cities, and note that there has been a real awakening and growth since the COVID-19 pandemic.

UKRAINIAN DISPLACED PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE: CRISIS, LABOUR LAWS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND NEW CONNECTIONS

Emil Hilton Saggau

In the early spring of 2022, I conducted fieldwork among Romanian labour migrants in the rural districts of Denmark, focusing on their relationship with both their own Orthodox church and the majority church of Denmark, the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The scope of the fieldwork changed dramatically, however, with the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine and the resulting flow of displaced Ukrainians. At the onset of the war, there were roughly 15,000 Ukrainian labour migrants in Denmark, largely intermingled with Romanians, Poles, and Belarusians. Within a few months, this number rose substantially to around 50,000. Similar rapid developments occurred across much of Western Europe. In Scandinavia, the number of Ukrainians reached 150,000 by September 2022, which is approximately 1% of the total population, making them one of the largest ethnic and religious migrant groups in the region. Together with the already significant influx of Romanian and Polish labour migrants, this profoundly altered Scandinavia's religious landscape. Even before 2022, Poles and Romanians had been quietly reshaping the region's religious composition, as Orthodox and Catholic churches grew in number. The arrival of displaced Ukrainians built on this trend, and many of the networks and mechanisms developed for labour migrants were simply extended to include them. A crucial example is that most displaced Ukrainians were granted residence permits under labour migrant schemes. The so-called Ukrainian laws in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, which provided residency, were essentially labour laws in their design.




Figure 1. Ukrainians in Scandinavia 2021–September 2022

This created an unprecedented situation, especially visible in rural Denmark. These areas often had the strongest ties to Ukraine through long-term collaboration in the agricultural sector, where Ukrainians worked seasonally or permanently and maintained family ties back home. These personal networks quickly became crucial. I visited a farmer outside a provincial town who was hosting 20 Ukrainians in his former workers' guesthouse. The family had fled from Bucha in the early days of the war, driving to Denmark by car. Some of them had worked for the farmer and kept in touch with him. As the war broke out, the farmer offered them a safe place, including care for a disabled child and elderly parents. The local church community, where the farmer was the congregation chair, mobilized to provide food and necessities. Smiling, the farmer told me that the Ukrainians “almost suffocated him”—then laughed: “I have never been hugged so much!” This was a vivid example of networks in action. As I left the farm, the Ukrainian remarked that her elderly mother had just sown vegetables in their front garden. This was for me both a symbolic act of hope and a reminder that the Ukrainians were probably going to stay for a longer period. They are still here today, their house in Bucha having been destroyed by the Russians, while many of their neighbours had been killed in the now infamous cleansing of Bucha perpetrated by the Russian army. The example from the local farmer highlighted that in Denmark, church circles, politicians, and diaconal organizations are all entangled and worked together—sometimes, at the start of the war, a bit chaotically, but effectively. The farmer was involved in local politics and chairing the local congregation, whereby his region today is one of the central hubs for Ukrainians in Denmark.

In late 2022, on behalf of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (ELCD), I conducted a survey among priests and deaneries to assess responses to displaced Ukrainians. This provides a glimpse into the early reaction of the ELCD. Between September and October 2022, 51 of 104 deaneries responded (49%), along with 587 of 1,932 priests (30%). Respondents were geographically balanced and broadly representative. The findings showed unprecedented engagement: 79% of priests held special services, processions, or prayers for Ukraine, and 88% mentioned Ukraine in church services, which is remarkably high compared with past crises. Over half (56%) personally

participated in support activities, while 54% contributed to events for Ukrainians. Deaneries reported extensive outreach, including housing, social activities, language cafés, job support, and legal assistance. Collaboration was widespread: 71% worked with organizations such as the Red Cross, Kirkens Korshær, and municipalities, and one-third engaged in fundraising or material aid. Non-participation was mostly due to the absence of refugees locally; only 3% questioned the Church’s responsibility for the Ukrainians. That is a low number for a country with a larger political segment being sceptical of migration and normally dominant in local rural districts.

Clergy also adapted liturgy: 37% incorporated Ukrainian elements such as choirs, translations, or candle lighting. Two Ukrainian-language brochures were produced to help newcomers follow services. Forty-three percent of priests reported Ukrainians attending their services, prompting new practices and occasional cultural challenges, such as requests for blessings unfamiliar to Lutheran tradition. Despite these differences, 91% of clergy believed the ELCD bore responsibility for both spiritual and social care, and 99% supported offering communion to Ukrainians regardless of confession.

This mobilization mirrored strong public and state support for Ukraine, as well as existing structures for Eastern European migrants. It was unprecedented for the ELCD, which had not mobilized at a similar scale since the Second World War—not even during the Syrian refugee crisis or the Yugoslav wars. A traditionally strong Lutheran church, the ELCD showed remarkable flexibility in 2022, incorporating icons, Orthodox Easter rituals, choirs, and candle lighting into spaces otherwise cleared of such elements due to theological preferences for simplicity.

Many priests and congregations hosted Ukrainians, laying the groundwork for deeper collaboration with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Metropolis. From 2023 onward, joint services, financial support, and shared commemorations strengthened ties, extending into high-profile events with Danish royalty and government. The connection has since grown into a formal ecumenical engagement: ELCD officials now guide and support the local Ukrainian Orthodox organization in Denmark. In 2025, the National Council of Denmark and the All-Ukrainian Council for Churches and Religious Organizations signed a memorandum of understanding, paving the way for further cooperation and solidarity visits. That autumn, the primates of the Scandinavian Lutheran churches made their first official visit to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, marking a new phase in relations. At the same time, Ukrainian military chaplains and their families came to Denmark on leave from the front, their travel and stay financed by private donations, highlighting

the continued commitment of Danish churches and society to Ukraine, even three and a half years into the war.



БОГОСЛУЖІННЯ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНЦІВ В ДАНІЇ

РІЗДВЯНІ
БОГОСЛУЖІННЯ-2023

 <p>19.12 - ОРХУС 19:00 <i>Christianskirke, Frederikshaldsgade, 13 8200</i></p> <p>20.12 - ОДЕНСЕ 19:30 <i>St. Hans Kirke, Bankt. Vogn. Pl. 8, 5220</i></p> <p>21.12 - КОПЕНГАГЕН 19:30 <i>Kristkirken, Haderslevvej 38, 6700</i></p> <p>25.12 - КОПЕНГАГЕН 10:30 <i>Arbejdskirken Søndergade 17 4662</i></p>	<p>З благословення Митрополита Київського і всієї України Епіфанія службу відправить о. Сергій Бережний</p>
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DIAKONIA

Ulla Siirto

Diakonia carries slightly different meanings across Christian traditions, but it is widely understood as a form of Christian social practice. It is considered the responsibility of every Christian, and it is rooted in Jesus' command to love one's neighbour. However, there are some differences in the meaning of deacon. In Catholic and Orthodox churches, a deacon is primarily associated with liturgical service and represents one step on the path toward priesthood; those working in the field of Christian social practice are named differently. In Protestant churches, however, a deacon is a person engaged in Christian social practice.

In the context of migration, *diakonia* is understood as a form of Christian social practice. It involves helping and supporting people in need. The belief that every person is created in the image of God provides the motivation to assist all individuals, regardless of their background. While charity is often perceived as a one-way relationship between a giver and a receiver, *diakonia* emphasizes reciprocity, where both parties are seen as givers and receivers. In *diakonia*, the person in need is respected as a subject whose agency is supported. It can include both spiritual and social support; one important aspect is advocacy for a more just society.



SHIPS OF SOLIDARITY: THE STORY OF UNITED4RESCUE

Ansgar Gilster

In the summer of 2019, an idea began to gain momentum that had long seemed impossible: purchasing a new civilian rescue ship through the church. Since 2017, the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) had already been supporting sea rescue efforts financially—for example, by helping to fund a reconnaissance aircraft. But an entire ship? Too complex, too risky, too “activist,” critics said. The turning point came in the summer of 2019, when the situation aboard the *Sea-Watch 3* off Lampedusa escalated. Italy’s then-Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, denied the ship a safe port for weeks. Meanwhile, 100,000 people gathered at the Kirchentag in Dortmund, a major Christian festival and platform for profound debates on contemporary issues. There, the situation of the *Sea-Watch 3* and the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean became a central topic. At one main panel discussion, the idea of a new rescue ship was voiced for the first time: “Together with civil society, cities, municipalities, the church, and all of you, we want to send a ship into the deadliest waters in the world—a ship of community, solidarity, and charity.”⁶⁸

These words sparked a wave of support. A petition to the EKD, thousands of emails, and intense consultations within church committees followed. The process was anything but simple, yet its pace impressed even critics. That autumn, despite ongoing controversy, the EKD founded United4Rescue, a non-governmental organization dedicated solely to saving lives at Europe’s external borders. In just four weeks, donations exceeding one million euros were raised, which was enough to purchase the first rescue ship in January 2020.

Today, five years later, four “alliance ships” fly the yellow United4Rescue flag in the Mediterranean. Together, they have saved more than 10,000 lives. United4Rescue continues to provide swift financial assistance for rescue missions and ship repairs when operations are at risk of failing due to a lack of funds.

What makes United4Rescue unique is that, for the first time, a major institution like the Protestant Church is not only voicing its support but visibly demonstrating it and inviting others to join. This stance carries risks. Like other rescue ships, the alliance vessels are repeatedly detained. Political pressure and ongoing attempts at criminalization are part of what it means to stand in solidarity with sea rescuers.

What is required is institutional courage and the willingness to cooperate with very different partners to put the common good above self-interest. Such cooperation is urgently needed. Only by acting together can we meet the great challenges of our time, from climate change to the continuing deaths in the Mediterranean.

While the EU tightens its deterrence policies and adapts laws to inhumane practices, United4Rescue demonstrates that civil society, municipalities, and the church can together send a powerful, life-saving signal.





In the shadow of the Acropolis, the promise of a new chapter for unaccompanied minors in Greece.

UNACCOMPANIED MINORS IN GREECE: TRENDS AND THE RESPONSE OF THE CHURCH OF GREECE

Panteleimon Papasynefakis

Over the past several years, Greece has remained one of the key entry points into Europe for refugees and migrants, including a significant number of unaccompanied minors (UAMs). These children, arriving without parents or guardians, are among the most vulnerable populations in the context of migration.

The Church of Greece, through its specialized nonprofit organization SYNYPARXIS – Ecumenical Refugee Programme, has been a consistent and trusted actor in the field of refugee protection. With a strong focus on human rights, child protection, and social inclusion, its work supports unaccompanied minors in their journey toward safety, recovery, autonomy, and meaningful integration. The church's response is rooted in both professional expertise and a long-standing commitment to upholding the dignity of every person.

The Evolving Landscape (2022–25)

Over the past few years, the landscape of migration in Greece has shifted significantly. While the total number of arrivals has decreased compared to the peak years of the refugee crisis, the protection needs of unaccompanied minors remain acute and complex.

The establishment of the Special Secretary for the Protection of Unaccompanied Minors in 2020 marked an important institutional step, accompanied by the adoption of the National Strategy for the Protection of UAMs, aiming for comprehensive, rights-based care.

Between 2021 and 2024, the number of UAMs in Greece remained relatively stable, hovering between 2,000 and 2,300 at any given time, with boys aged 16 to 18 making up the largest group. Most originate from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and African countries; their journeys are often marked by trauma, violence, family separation, and exploitation. As of mid-2025, 2,115 unaccompanied minors are officially recorded in Greece, according to the Ministry of Migration and Asylum. Though this represents a slight decrease from previous years, the protection needs remain urgent. The vast majority are boys aged 15 to 17 (about 93%), with 12.6% under the age of 15. Only a small percentage are girls (around 7%).

While Greece has made some strides in improving care for UAMs, challenges persist, including gaps in safe shelter availability, limited access to education, legal insecurity, and bureaucratic obstacles to family reunification and long-term integration. Despite the efforts of the state and partner organizations, many children remain at

risk of prolonged institutionalization, mental health deterioration, and social marginalization.

The Response of the Church of Greece

The Church of Greece has long engaged in migration-related work. Through SYNYPARXIS, it provides legal aid, psychosocial support, advocacy, and integration services for refugees and asylum seekers. The aim is not merely to provide aid but to empower each individual to regain autonomy, rebuild their lives with dignity, and actively participate in the society where they now reside. Our work is rooted in our theological commitment to the dignity of every human being, made in the image of God and guided by principles of human rights, inclusion, and long-term integration, with a strong emphasis on holistic care, resilience-building, and mutual respect between newcomers and host communities.

Sheltering Hope: Comprehensive Care for UAMs

Since 2020, following a request from the Greek government, the Church of Greece has expanded its engagement in child protection by establishing shelters for unaccompanied minors in Attica and Northern Greece.

Operated through SYNYPARXIS, these shelters have accommodated hundreds of children over the years and offer far more than a safe place to stay. They provide a wide range of services—including psychological support, legal aid, educational tutoring, and structured daily activities—designed to foster resilience, healing, and personal development. The shelters emphasize a family-like environment, trauma-informed care, and age-appropriate engagement through specialized professionals trained to respond to the emotional and developmental needs of children who have experienced displacement, loss, or violence.

At the same time, SYNYPARXIS works to equip each child with the skills, confidence, and support they need to prepare for adulthood, helping them imagine, pursue, and shape their own future with hope and determination.

COMPASS – ΠΥΞΙΔΑ: Filling the Gaps

In 2023, SYNYPARXIS began coordinating the national-level project COMPASS – ΠΥΞΙΔΑ, funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and implemented by a consortium of five partners. The project aims to create a supplementary protection mechanism that supports and enhances the National Strategy for Unaccompanied Minors in Greece. Designed to address emerging needs and structural gaps, the project includes:

- Five specialized centres across Greece offer mental health care, legal services, education support, and vocational training. Special focus is given to trauma counselling, psychiatric care, and life skills development, helping minors to recover and prepare for autonomy
- Training and clinical supervision for professionals working with minors
- Emergency escort services for minors in need of immediate transport or hospitalization
- Educational materials and workshops that support resilience, integration, and future planning

The COMPASS Centres serve not only children under 18 but also young adults aged 18 to 21 who have arrived in Greece as unaccompanied minors, are transitioning into adulthood, and are often falling through institutional gaps.

A Role for the Churches

The Church of Greece leverages its unique position: it has access to government decision-makers and is able to raise awareness, advocate, and collaborate with public actors to ensure better care for UAMs. Although the space for large-scale systemic change is limited, this access is actively used to promote the interests and rights of vulnerable populations.

At a time when European migration policy is increasingly focused on deterrence and externalization, churches are called to set a different tone: one of compassion, inclusion, and justice. The Church of Greece's long-standing commitment to protecting refugees, especially unaccompanied children, affirms that *diakonia* is not charity; it is discipleship.



Mercury

Earth

Mars

Saturn

BETWEEN RECOVERY AND BELONGING: AIDROM'S SUPPORT FOR UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN ROMANIA'S MOLDOVA REGION

Michael Tița

When millions of people fled Ukraine after the outbreak of war in February 2022, Romania became a country of both transit and refuge. In the eastern part of the country, the Moldova region—particularly cities like Iași and Galați—saw a steady flow of arrivals. Some stayed briefly; others began to rebuild their lives. For many, AIDRom (the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania) became a point of first contact and, later, a long-term partner in recovery, dignity, and integration.

From Emergency Response to Long-Term Support

Since the early days of the war, AIDRom has been present on the ground offering humanitarian aid and psychosocial support; it later expanded its work to include educational, cultural, and employment-focused activities. Through EU-funded programmes such as Include-UA and Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Conflict-Affected Populations in Romania – 2024, implemented in partnership with the International Organization for Migration, AIDRom's team has developed a model of care that prioritizes both immediate relief and long-term integration.

Culture as Connection

In the Moldova region, cultural activities have played a significant role in helping refugees, especially women and children, navigate their new reality and connect with Romanian society. Visits to local heritage sites such as the Metropolitan Museum in Iași, the Palace of Culture, and the Casa Cuza-Vodă Museum in Galați offered opportunities to explore Romanian history and spirituality. These outings were not simply educational—they fostered dialogue, curiosity, and emotional grounding.

Hands-on workshops further deepened these experiences. Participants created Christmas floral decorations, learned about iconography, practised textile felting, and attended pottery workshops where they could shape both clay and their own resilience. In one session in Iași, twenty Ukrainian participants moulded clay as a form of healing, drawing inspiration from José Martí's belief that "love makes clay miraculous." Such experiences, rooted in creativity, became spaces for emotional expression and community building.



Children, Confidence, and Imagination

Children were placed at the heart of AIDRom's activities. In both Galați and Iași, educational workshops used play and creativity to stimulate learning and wellbeing. Language games, science-themed lessons about the solar system, and even chess training offered them ways to express themselves and develop new skills. A notable example was the January 2025 visit to the Natural Science Museum in Galați, where children learned about bees and biodiversity through interactive exhibits and honey tasting.

One popular activity was the "Letters and Games" workshop, where children learned to associate words with their names, build with clay, and develop memory and spatial thinking. These were not only methods of learning; they were tools for healing and self-confidence. In a world marked by displacement, having a safe space to laugh, ask questions, and make friends matters deeply.

Art and the Journey to Self-Reliance

AIDRom's integration approach balances personal healing with professional empowerment. In 2024 and 2025, AIDRom supported refugees through job fairs in Iași and Galați, accompanying participants and helping them navigate interviews and employer expectations. For some, this was the first direct step toward regaining financial autonomy. For others, it was a symbolic gesture—a reminder that their experience, skills, and dignity still hold value in a new context.

Complementing these efforts were vocational trainings such as hairstyling courses, designed to help participants develop marketable skills. As one refugee put it, “It was more than a course—it was a sign that we can still build something.”

Art also proved to be a gateway to self-discovery and empowerment. Painting sessions, floral design workshops, and candle-making events gave participants moments of calm and personal expression. These spaces—often filled with colour, music, and the scent of flowers or wax—provided not just relief but a kind of cultural translation. They showed that beauty, hope, and new beginnings are still possible.

Building Community Through Shared Moments

Integration is not just a bureaucratic process; it’s about creating bonds. That’s why AIDRom also focuses on recreational activities that bring people together. Picnics in public parks, shared meals, sports outings at adventure parks, and visits to the Galaxy Arena—where young refugees explored virtual reality—gave people moments of joy and togetherness.

One of the most moving events took place in December 2023, when AIDRom, in partnership with the Galați Children’s Palace, hosted six interactive Christmas workshops for 120 Romanian and Ukrainian children. The result was a vibrant celebration of creativity, shared



culture, and trust. As one organizer said, “We prepared these activities with our whole heart. The children worked side by side, they learned from one another, and their laughter filled the room.”

Faith, Compassion, and the Role of the Church

Based on its primary Christian structure and nature, AIDRom’s work is deeply informed by ecumenical values: hospitality, compassion, and care for the vulnerable. In Moldova, the association has acted as a bridge between churches, civil society, and public institutions. It has been shown that spiritual values can translate into practical, professional support.

Perhaps more importantly, it has modelled what it means to treat refugees not just as beneficiaries but as neighbours. Through consistent presence, attention to individual stories, and the creation of inclusive spaces, AIDRom has helped many refugees begin to see Romania not just as a place of temporary refuge but as a place where they are welcome to belong.





ADVOCACY

Torsten Moritz

Advocacy of churches in the area of migration is the effort to influence the legislation and reality affecting migrants—asylum applicants, refugees, labour migrants, or others—for a more humane and protection-oriented direction.

“Advocacy is the deliberate process, based on demonstrated evidence, to directly and indirectly influence decision-makers, stakeholders and relevant audiences to support and implement actions that contribute to the fulfillment of [human] rights.”⁶⁹ It “involves engaging with those in power to promote and protect human rights, particularly for individuals and groups facing discrimination or marginalization.”⁷⁰

In many aspects, advocacy is similar to lobbying. Advocacy, however, usually aims at bringing forward a concern or conviction of the person or organization doing the advocating, whereas lobbying usually is putting forward the own interest(s) of a person or organization.

BRITISH CHURCHES' RESPONSE TO A PROPOSAL TO SEND ASYLUM SEEKERS TO RWANDA

Simeon Mitchell

A central policy aim of successive British governments has been to curb immigration by irregular routes, and especially the numbers of people crossing the English Channel to seek sanctuary in the UK. Over the last few years, this aim has been pursued with a toxic combination of harsh legislation and even harsher rhetoric, but limited effectiveness.

In April 2022, Britain's Conservative (centre-right wing) government was facing a perceived failure to fulfil its promise to "take back control" of UK borders and levels of immigration after Brexit—and political threats from its right in particular. It announced that it had agreed a Migration and Economic Development Partnership with the government of Rwanda, under which the UK would be able to send people seeking asylum to Rwanda, where the Rwandan government would decide their asylum claims.

This so-called Rwanda plan would not be, as was often misunderstood, offshore processing on behalf of the UK, but a permanent relocation. If applicants' claims were successful, they would be granted asylum in Rwanda, and even if not, they would be offered the opportunity to settle there. The focus would be on people who had arrived by what were deemed to have been dangerous or irregular routes, who had travelled through safe countries before getting to the UK.

In return, an initial payment of 140 million British pounds was made to Rwanda, with more to follow as the plan was implemented.

Nobody expected the number of people involved to be very high, with the Rwandan government suggesting it would take 1,000 asylum seekers in an initial five-year trial period. However, the policy's intended impact was much wider, as its stated purpose was to provoke a deterrent effect and reduce the numbers seeking to travel to the UK. There was great scepticism about this, such that the civil service required special instructions from government ministers to go ahead with the plan, even when there was insufficient evidence that it would provide value for public expenditure.

That was just one of many hurdles that got in the way of the implementation of the policy over the two years that followed.

From the outset, British churches, through their leaders, were vocal in their opposition to the Rwanda plan. Many had already been engaged with debates around specific pieces of asylum legislation, and working together in various ways on this, and this helped to embolden churches to speak out with vigour and remarkable unity in response to the announcement.

Within 24 hours, the president and vice-president of the Methodist Church issued a statement lamenting that "people [seeking asylum] are not a problem to be dealt with, but are individuals with inherent value and dignity made in the image of God. Sending some of the most vulnerable people in the world thousands of miles away to be imprisoned does not respect this dignity."⁷¹

The moderator of the General Assembly of the United Reformed Church said: "To criminalize and discriminate against those asylum seekers who currently have little choice but to arrive in the UK through "irregular routes," when the majority have a legitimate basis for their asylum claim, is a disgraceful and dishonourable policy . . . it is a denial of the UK's responsibilities and of the rights and dignity of refugees."



The main objections expressed by churches to the Rwanda plan were not about Rwanda as a country itself, but the principle of the UK not taking responsibility for people who seek sanctuary and safety in the country, and what it said about how society treats vulnerable people. Nor was the focus on the UK's obligation to comply with its international legal responsibilities, human rights law, or the ECHR, because it was recognised that that was a fight that those on the political right wanted to have. Rather, criticisms were predominantly theologically-rooted moral arguments about points of principle.

What particularly caught public attention was when the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, used his high-profile Easter sermon to condemn the plan. Highlighting “serious ethical questions about sending asylum seekers overseas,” he acknowledged that while “the details are for politics, the principle must stand the judgment of God, and it cannot.”⁷² Linking to the message of the crucifixion and resurrection, he went on to argue that “sub-contracting out our responsibilities . . . is the opposite of the nature of God, who himself took responsibility for our failures.”

This sermon led the news and generated front-page newspaper headlines, generating a predictable reaction in response and sparking a debate on whether faith leaders should involve themselves in politics. However, the Churches were undeterred in their opposition.

Of course, it was not only the churches that criticised the plan. Many civil society groups also spoke out, and there were challenges in the courts, protests, and activists tried to prevent flights from leaving. But it was striking that the Churches provided some of the leading voices providing the loudest public criticism of the plan on moral grounds. Opposition politicians were timid about making that case, instead limiting their criticisms to the likely ineffectiveness or unworkability of the proposals.

The UK's incoming Labour government eventually cancelled the Rwanda plan in July 2024. By that point, it was estimated that the scheme had cost over 700 million British pounds. No one was ever sent by the UK to Rwanda, other than four people under a voluntary resettlement scheme. But the idea—and its political appeal—has not gone away, and British churches remain ready to mobilise and speak out again if necessary in the future.



Undocumented persons performing Joseph, Mary and the three Magi within the framework of the campaign "Enough room in the inn," advocating for the preservation of "the bed, bath, and bread" programme for undocumented refugees.

BED, BATH, AND BREAD: A CASE STUDY FROM THE NETHERLANDS

Karel Jungheim

Since 2000, the laws in the Netherlands have severely limited the rights of people living in the Netherlands in an irregular situation, such as asylum seekers whose application has been denied, but who are, for different reasons, still staying in the country. In January 2013, the Protestant Church of the Netherlands, through the Conference of European Churches, formally lodged a complaint against the State of the Netherlands at the European Committee for Social Rights (ECSR) of the Council of Europe. This committee is charged with overseeing states' observance of the Social Charter, a charter ratified by the Dutch State. The central issue of the complaint was that withholding food, shelter, and clothing from undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers whose applications have been denied was endangering their right to life and their right to humane treatment, and in violation of the Charter.

After the ECSR had decided in 2014 that the Dutch state had indeed violated the Charter, several emergency shelters (also known as bed-bath-bread facilities) were set up by NGOs and financially supported by municipal authorities. In 2017, the national government decided to start and finance a national scheme called *Landelijke Vreemdelingen Voorziening* (LVV),⁷³ where rejected asylum seekers could apply for shelter on the condition that they were willing to cooperate in achieving a “durable solution.” The national government mandated the scheme to the municipal authorities of five major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven, and Groningen). These, in turn, signed agreements with local NGOs for implementation. The LVV scheme was relatively successful in achieving results for the clients.

However, after elections for the national Parliament in November 2023 with a landslide victory for the populist Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, the Netherlands has had a right-wing four-party coalition government since July 2024, proclaiming “the toughest asylum policy ever.” On 4 September 2024, Minister Faber (Asylum and Migration) announced that national government financing to bed-bath-bread facilities would end as of 1 January 2025.

On 5 September 2024, the Protestant Church in the Netherlands issued a public statement which can be translated as follows: “We must never abandon the most vulnerable people in our society. By abolishing the bed-bath-bread scheme, people will end up living on the streets. With this measure, we are sinking through a moral threshold.”⁷⁴ René de Reuver, secretary of the General Synod, said: “When even the most minimal means to help people are no longer allowed, there is little left of humanity. A government should be a shield for the weak, but now we are totally letting these vulnerable people down.”



Though the announcement to end the *financial allocation* got most attention, in the letter to the Parliament of 5 September, the minister also announced the end of the *mandate* of the LVV.

The official reaction of the minister to the question: “Where could these people go, if the LVV is stopped?” has repeatedly been that after a failed asylum application, these people have the obligation to leave, and that the pre-removal centre VBL in Ter Apel or, eventually, municipal bed-bath-bread facilities are available. As the decision of the minister took away the rights of those who benefit from a stay in the LVV, the lawyer, who also had worked with the Protestant Church on the 2013 complaint, on behalf of his clients, started a court case, arguing that these people could go nowhere else, and had the right to basic emergency support.

The Protestant Church considers the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Changu case of September 12, 2024, as a positive development in this respect. It ruled that a member state of the European Union “must also ensure that a third-country national staying illegally in their territory is not, as long as he has not been removed from that territory, in a situation prohibited by Article 4 of the Charter” (a situation of serious material deprivation).⁷⁵

In December, the first LVV cases were dealt with in local courts. Judges in Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amsterdam ruled that, awaiting a final decision, the clients would have

the right to stay in the respective LVV, to be financed by the national government.

During the Christmas time, a coalition of about 30 local and national diaconal organizations, including Kerk in Actie of the Protestant Church, started a campaign to collect Christmas cards to MPs, requesting that the bed-bath-bread facilities be continued by the national government. On 5 February 2025, thousands of cards were handed to MPs in the National Parliament.

At the moment, the outcome of the court case of the LVV-clients is still awaited.

The Protestant Church fully supports the work of the lawyers of the LVV-clients, as a positive outcome of these court cases would confirm the very basic rights of rejected asylum seekers and other people without a residence status and the government’s obligation to unconditionally provide basic assistance to everyone in need. The Protestant Church, with others, will continue to advocate for these rights, hoping for an outcome like in Luke 18:1-5, the parable of the persistent widow.



A delegation of Dutch diaconal organizations and NGOs offers Christmas cards to Dutch MPs, in the House of Parliament, on February 4th, 2025, within the framework of the campaign “Enough room in the inn,” advocating for the preservation of “the bed, bath, and bread” programme for undocumented refugees.



THE 2024 PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi

The reform process of the EU asylum law, known as the Common European Asylum System, began in response to the 2015 refugee crisis, which led to ongoing issues including stricter refugee policies, reintroduced border controls, and feelings of unfair distribution of responsibility, especially among southern EU countries (the Med 5: Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Malta). The Pact on Migration and Asylum focuses primarily on the internal dimension of asylum; notwithstanding its title, migration is largely absent from the text.

Initial reform proposals were made in 2016, covering various regulations such as the Recast Reception Conditions Directive, Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), Union Resettlement Framework, Qualification Regulation, and Eurodac Regulation. Further proposals came in 2020 as part of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, which included updates to the APR and new regulations on Asylum and Migration Management Regulation, Screening Regulation, and Crisis Regulation.


In 2021, additional proposals addressed the Schengen Border Code and Instrumentalisation Regulation. The European Parliament opposed the Instrumentalisation

Regulation per se but agreed at the end to include provisions from the Instrumentalisation Regulation in the Crisis file.

After years of negotiations, on 10 April 2024, the European Parliament approved the new rules.⁷⁶ The Council of the EU gave its green light on 14 May 2024.

As part of the new Pact, the Commission proposed mandatory pre-entry screening involving security and identity checks for anyone entering the EU irregularly. The proposals also introduce compulsory asylum and return procedures at borders, potentially lasting up to 40 weeks in crisis situations. Undocumented individuals in Europe may undergo pre-entry screening and face detention, even if they have been living in the EU. Return procedures could be initiated, and the Pact limits access to residence procedures and regular pathways besides asylum. People arriving irregularly in the EU or after search-and-rescue operations may face immediate detention during pre-entry screening. Asylum border procedures, lasting up to 12 weeks, may result in detention. Rejected asylum seekers could be subject to refusal of entry at external borders, with fewer safeguards.

NEW PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: TIMELINE AND MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS



The Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) and other Christian organizations had both prior to the publication of the Pact proposals and after its launch expressed concern about the impact the Pact would have on human rights safeguards, especially for undocumented individuals and children.⁷⁷

After the adoption of the Pact, CCME has been actively engaged in the implementation process, advocating for a more comprehensive and balanced approach. In particular, CCME consistently emphasizes the need to balance frontloading measures with robust monitoring, adequate capacities, and sustainable protection standards to ensure respect for human rights. As well, CCME is involved in efforts to influence the review of the safe third-country concept.

EU ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE: STEP-BY-STEP ADVOCACY STRATEGY

Ana Puljiz and Yasmine K. Rishmawi

Step 1: Planning, Identifying, and Prioritizing the Issue

Effective advocacy requires focused efforts and careful selection of key goals. Organizations should prioritise areas aligned with their mandate, expertise, and geographic focus, avoiding duplication. Collaborating with others in the sector enhances impact. Each organization should identify areas where its skills can make the most difference—that includes seeing how much resources an organization can invest in advocacy.

Step 2: Setting the Goal and Objectives

Advocacy should be structured like a project, with well-defined general and specific objectives tied to expected results. A clear description of objectives and priorities is crucial, avoiding vague goals. Define the desired change and the method to achieve it, and a realistic timeline. Flexibility is key, allowing adjustments if a strategy proves ineffective.

Step 3: Build Alliances

Collaboration enhances advocacy impact. Alliances leverage the strengths of each partner, dividing tasks for efficiency. Forming alliances with regions or countries facing similar issues is beneficial. So, check who is out there, and if you can link up. In some cases, you will find that the activity you wanted to undertake has already been carried out by someone else.

Step 4: Identify Stakeholders

Conducting a thorough stakeholder analysis is crucial for effective advocacy. It helps identify direct and indirect targets, potential allies, interests, conflicts, and existing

relationships. It guides engagement levels throughout the plan. To implement it, list stakeholders, assess their relevance, map contacts including political and technical staff, and use tools like the power and participation matrices.

Step 5: Map Your Resources

Evaluate internal resources available for advocacy efforts, considering financial, human, and expertise aspects. Identify gaps and explore collaboration opportunities. Prioritize resource allocation based on issue significance. Consider partnerships, grants, and fundraising strategies for additional resources.

Step 6: Design the Action Plan

Develop a detailed action plan outlining activities, timelines, responsibilities, and milestones. Define communication strategies, key messages, target audiences, and dissemination channels. Allocate tasks among team members, anticipate challenges, and outline contingency plans. Ensure alignment with overall advocacy goals.

Step 7: Implement, Monitor, and Evaluate

Execute the action plan systematically, adhering to timelines and milestones. Regularly monitor progress, collect data on key performance indicators, and adjust strategies as needed. Engage stakeholders, partners, and allies, maintaining open communication. Evaluate impact against predefined objectives, considering short-term and long-term outcomes. Adapt strategies based on evolving contexts and feedback. Document lessons learned and best practices for future initiatives.





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PHOTO CREDITS

PAGE	DESCRIPTION	CREDIT
Cover Photo	11 March 2022, Vyšné Nemecké, Slovakia: Refugee families from Ukraine run for the bus that is to take them further into Slovakia from the Vyšné Nemecké border crossing between Slovakia and Ukraine	Albin Hillert
4	Passerelle des Deux Rives	Matthias Süßen
6	Returning of Ukrainian women and children from Syrian refugee camp	President.gov.ua
7	Those from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection in the EU	Eurostat
8	Top 10 citizenships granted first residence permits in the EU, 2023	Eurostat
9	Sea Watch	Maria Giulia Trombini
11	Departure in Ukraine	Sean Sutton/MAG
12	Non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine and were under temporary protection at the end of September 2025	Source datasets Eurostat: migr_asytspm and migr_asytspop; Map available at https://shorturl.at/r4Bb7
13	Ukrainian supermarket in Prague	Kirk Sims
14	Ukraine woman as fighting took place nearby	Sean Sutton
15	First-time resident permits in the EU between 2014 and 2023	European Commission
16	Map of migrant routes along Europe's southern border	DTM Europe
16	Attempts, failures, and fatalities on Europe's southern border	DTM Europe
17	Rescue in the Mediterranean	Arez Ghaderi / SOS Humanity
18	Location of Syria	Created with MapChart
20	The old cemetery of Lampedusa holds a space to honour the memory of the ones who lost their lives trying to reach Europe through the sea. Crosses made with pieces from the boats carrying refugees mark the graveyard of dozen unidentified bodies. In the first 5 months of 2022, Lampedusa recorded the arrival of over 6,000 migrants to the island.	Marcelo Schneider
74	Resettled unaccompanied minors by age, sex, and citizenship - annual data - 2023	Eurostat

PAGE	DESCRIPTION	CREDIT
74	First-time asylum applicants in EU countries, 2008-2024	Eurostat
75	Annual recognition rates at first instance by decision outcome, 2015–2024	Eurostat
75	Asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data	Eurostat
76	First-time asylum applicants by age and sex, 2024	Eurostat
77	Irregular Border Crossings 2015-2024	International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)
78	Population structure by major age groups, EU, 2009-2100	Eurostat
78	Resettled Persons Annual Data 2024	Eurostat
79	First instance recognition rates across the EU+ 2024	European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)
80	Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded)	Eurostat
81	Top 10 citizenships of unaccompanied minors who applied for asylum in the EU, 2024	Eurostat
82	Top 15 citizenships of first-time asylum applicants in the EU, 2014-2024	Eurostat
83	Unaccompanied minor asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data	Eurostat
84	Rescue by the Sea-Eye	Guillaume Duez
89	Ships Sea-Eye 4 and Sea-Eye 5	Roman Rohr
91	Ships Sea-Eye 5	Guillaume Duez
96	Rev. Prof. Dr Sang Chang among other WCC Central Committee members during the prayer service in the chapel of the Ecumenical centre in Geneva	Albin Hillert
102	Roma congregation in Germany	Undisclosed church
102	Roma congregation in Germany	Undisclosed church
102	Roma congregation in Germany	Undisclosed church
105	Ukrainians in Scandinavia 2021– September 2022	Emil Bjørn Hilton Saggau
105	Ukrainian and Danish worship	Emil Bjørn Hilton Saggau

PAGE	DESCRIPTION	CREDIT
105	Ukrainian Christmas church services in Denmark	Emil Bjørn Hilton Saggau
105	Ukrainians worshipping in Deenmark	Ole Wagner; Emil Bjørn Hilton Saggau
108	SOS Humanity	Pietro Bertora
109	Aboard United4Rescue's ship Sea-Eye	Guillaume Duez
109	Rescue by the SOS Humanity	Arez Ghaderi
109	Rescue by the Sea-Eye	Leon Salner
110	Unaccompanied Minors in Greece	SYNYPARXIS -Ecumenical Refugee Programme
112	Children being served by AIDRom	AIDRom
113	Origins in Ukraine and location of ministries by AIDRom	Created with MapChart
114	Children being served by AIDRom	AIDRom
117	Distance between the UK and Rwanda	Created with MapChart
120	Undocumented persons performing Joseph, Mary and the three Magi within the framework of the campaign "Enough room in the inn", advocating for the preservation of 'the bed bath bread' program for undocumented refugees.	Peter van Beek
122	A delegation of Dutch diaconal organisations and NGOs offers Christmas cards to Dutch MPs, in the House of Parliament, on February 4th, 2025, within the framework of the campaign "Enough room in the inn", advocating for the preservation of 'the bed bath bread' program for undocumented refugees.	griffie Tweede Kamer
123	European Parliament building in Strasbourg, France	Freepik
124	New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Timeline and Main Achievements	European Commission
125	Steps	Freepik
126	Departure in Ukraine	Sean Sutton/MAG
131	Lviv Railway Station	Sean Sutton/MAG
Back Cover	A Greek volunteer waves at a refugee boat in the Aegean Sea, directing it toward a safe place to land on a beach near Molyvos, on the Greek island of Lesbos.	Paul Jeffrey

Mapping Migration, 4th Edition, Voices from Churches in Europe documents the evolving role of faith communities as they navigate the complex realities of migration. These essays, case studies, data sets, and maps collected here come out of the experiences of churches as they encounter migrants and wrestle with what welcome and solidarity demand in practice. Migrants from within Europe and from beyond are actively shaping the European landscape.



This edition begins with broad themes in migration and those with a migration experience or background, then moves into thinking theologically about migration. After that, you will find case studies that highlight Christian unity, *diakonia*, and advocacy.



This volume is intended as a resource for church leaders and practitioners who seek to understand and respond faithfully to migration in their contexts. As you read through *Mapping Migration*, listen to these voices from the churches, and may they inspire a response of welcome, embrace, or advocacy in your context.



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